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I.

INTRODUCTION

Regulatory taking doctrine is the most perplexing area of
American land use law. Despite scholarly obsession and frequent litigation, the most fundamental questions about regula-

tory takings' remain unresolved. Are the taking clauses of
federal and state constitutions2 even applicable to police power
regulation of land use and development? If so, what limitations
* Professor of Law, University of Puget Sound School of Law; of Counsel, Foster,
Pepper & Shefelman, Seattle. The author served as a consultant to and testified as an
expert on behalf of Skagit County in the Orion litigation. See infra note 10.
1. This theme is developed in the first two parts of the Article. The elusiveness of
definitive regulatory taking standards is not surprising given the infinite range of
public purposes and private effects of police power regulation. Of course, the matter
could be simplified somewhat by holding that the taking limitation and its
compensation remedy do not apply to otherwise proper police power regulation. But
that would leave the essentially similar, if remedially different, question of when
regulation violates substantive due process because of its depreciating and
disappointing effect on private property ownership. These fundamental questions of
social policy, whether stated in terms of the taking or substantive due process
limitations, are not amenable to clear and simple answers. The quest for doctrine to
resolve the issue has been characterized as the "lawyer's equivalent to the physicist's
hunt for the quark." C. HAAR, LAND USE PLANNING 766 (3d ed. 1976).
Among the most recent scholarly attempts to describe, untie, or cut this Gordian
Knot are articles contained in a Columbia Law Review symposium, The Jurisprudence
of Takings, 88 COLUM. L. REv. 1581 (1988): Fischel, Introduction: Utilitarian
Balancing and Formalism in Takings, 1581; Michelman, TakingA 1987, 1600; Kmiec,
The Original Understandingof the Taking Clause is Neither Weak Nor Obtuse, 1630;
Radin, The Liberal Conception of Property: Cross Currents in the Jurisprudenceof
Takings, 1667; Rose-Ackerman, Against Ad Hockery: A Comment on Michelman, 1697;
Michelman, A Reply to Susan Rose-Ackerman, 1712; Tideman, Takings, Moral
Evolution, and Justice, 1714; Sterk, Nollan, Henry George, and Exactions, 1731;
Alexander, Takings, Narratives, and Power, 1752; Fisher, The Significance of Public
Perceptions qf the Takings Doctrine,1774. See also Callies, PropertyRight-"Are There

Any Left?, 20 URBAN LAw. 597 (1988) [hereinafter Callies].
2. See infra text accompanying notes 22, 26.
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on police power regulation do the taking clauses impose? And
what are the legal consequences of transgressions? To call the
collective judicial responses to these questions doctrine is an
exaggeration. Ad hocery is a more accurate characterization.3
There is nothing even approaching a clearly articulated system
of principles governing the resolution of regulatory taking
claims,4 as the United States Supreme Court routinely
concedes. 5
[Tihis Court, quite simply, has been unable to develop any
"set formula" for determining when "justice and fairness"
require that economic injuries caused by public action be
compensated by the government, rather than remain disproportionately concentrated on a few persons.... Indeed, we
have frequently observed that whether a particular restriction will be rendered invalid by the government's failure to
pay for any losses proximately caused by it depends largely
"upon the particular circumstances [in that] case. 6
Until its decision in First English Evangelical Lutheran
COurch v. Los Angeles County,7 the Supreme Court had
refrained from explicitly deciding the threshold question of
whether the burdens imposed on private property by police
power measures were constitutionally limited by the federal
taking clause, itself, in addition to substantive due process.'
Having decided that both limitations apply, the Court, however, has offered no explanation of their relationship and
3. See Rose-Ackerman, Against Ad Hocery: A Comment On Michelman, 88
COLUM. L. REv. 1697 (1988). [hereinafter Rose-Ackerman]
4. Judicial efforts to chart a usable test for determining when police power
measures impair constitutionally compensable losses have, on the whole, been
notably unsuccessful. With some exceptions, the decisional law is largely
characterized by confusing and incompatible results, often explained in
conclusionary terminology, circular reasoning, and empty rhetoric. Even the
modicum of predictability, which might otherwise inhere in the pattern of
judicial precedents, is impaired by the frequently reiterated judicial
declaration that each case must be decided on its own facts.
Van Alstyne, Taking or Damaging By Police Power: 7he Search for Inverse Condemnation Criteria,44 S. CAL. L. REv. 1, 2 (1970). See also Kanner, Inverse Condemnation
Remedies in an Era of Uncertainty,INST. ON PLAN., ZONING, & EMINENT DoMAIN 177,
179 (1980).
5. Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 175 (1979); see Keystone
Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470, 485-86 (1987).
6. Penn Central Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978) (citations
omitted).
7. 107 S. Ct. 2378 (1987).
8. See Williamson County Regional Planning Comm'n v. Hamilton Bank, 473 U.S.
172, 197-99 (1985).
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respective requirements.9
Within a recent two-month period, the Washington
Supreme Court issued decisions in two major regulatory taking
cases, Orion Corporation v. State,'0 and Allingham v. City of
Seattle." In both cases, land use regulations were challenged
on the basis of the taking clauses of the federal and state constitutions. In the Orion litigation, the owners of a large tract
of Puget Sound tidelands asserted a constitutional right to
compensation for a taking of property by state and local regulations restricting use and development of the tidelands. In
Allingham, a group of Seattle landowners sought invalidation
of a city ordinance restricting development of land within designated "greenbelt preserves."
In the Orion decision, the Washington Supreme Court,
venturing where other courts had feared to go, began the painful process of developing coherent legal doctrine to supplant
vague or nonexistent principles and intuitive determinations. 2
The purpose of the court's elaborate exposition of the law and
policy of regulatory takings seemed clear-to establish a mode
of analysis and decisional principles that would provide significant guidance in an area of legendary uncertainty. Of course,
Orion was not expected to be the last word. Its principles
would be refined, explained, and perhaps revised by future
decisions. But it was regarded as a major initiative that clearly
implied a judicial commitment to continue the process of
developing cogent doctrine and a promise that resolution of
regulatory taking claims would become increasingly predictable.' 3 Landowners and regulatory policymakers would sleep
9. See First English, 107 S. Ct. 2378, 2385-87; Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n,
107 S. Ct. 3141, 3146-48 (1987).
10. 109 Wash. 2d 621, 747 P.2d 1062 (1987), cert denied, 108 S. Ct. 1996 (1988)
[hereinafter cited as Orion I]. Orion rl was preceeded by a 1985 decision, Orion Corp.
v. State, 103 Wash. 2d 441, 693 P.2d 1369 (1985) [hereinafter cited as Orion 1]. For a
procedural history of the Orion litigation, see infra text accompanying notes 136-42.
11. 109 Wash. 2d 947, 749 P.2d 160, modified, 757 P.2d 533 (1988).
12. See supra notes 4-6 and accompanying text.
13. The court stated:
By clearly delineating when an excessive regulation violates substantive
due process, as opposed to accomplishing a de facto eminent domain taking,
we can best protect the property owner from shouldering the cost of a burden
the public should bear, without unnecessarily creating the specter of
unanticipated financial damages for all excessive regulations. Thus, our
approach enables us to meet our most important consideration of reconciling
"property rights and social needs."
Orion II, 109 Wash. 2d at 651, 747 P.2d at 1078 (quoting Department of Ecology v.
Pacesetter Const. Co., 89 Wash. 2d 203, 210, 571 P.2d 196, 200 (1977)).
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better.
Orion's ink was scarcely dry when the prospect of coherent doctrine was dashed by Allingham. Allingham was as
cryptic as Orion was enlightening. Allingham ignored Orion
and the elaborate analytical framework the court had so painstakingly established. 1 4 The only decisional principle clearly
articulated in Allingham was directly contrary to well-established state and federal law.'5 As shockingly disappointing as
Allingham was, the land use law community assumed that its
shortcomings, no doubt, resulted from a mechanical glitch in
the court's mysterious opinion writing and review processes or
from a breakdown in communication among the justices;
reconsideration would eliminate the dissonance and restore
Orion's promise of coherent regulatory taking doctrine.'167
Briefs in support of a motion for reconsideration were filed,
arguing primarily for doctrinal consistency rather than a different result. Surprisingly, the court denied the City's motion
for reconsideration and issued a terse "Order Changing Opinion," adding a three-sentence explanatory footnote that, while
citing and apparently reaffirming Orion, raised more questions
than it resolved.' 8
14. Orion II was not even cited in Allingham as originally issued. The court,
however, added a footnote to Allingham citing Orion II by an Order Changing
Opinion, Allingham v. City of Seattle, No. 52871-2 (July 15, 1988) [hereinafter Order
Changing Opinion]. See Allingham, 109 Wash. 2d at 953 n.1, 749 P.2d 160, modified,
757 P.2d at 533 n.1. See ikfra note 18 and accompanying text.
15. See infra text accompanying notes 370-78.
16. See Stoebuck, "Regulatory Takings," Washington Condemnation and
Regulatory Takings 104-08 (1988); Settle, "Regulatory Takings, the Public Trust
Doctrine, Odds and Ends," 1988 ENvTL. & LAND USE L. SEM. 3A-18, 19.
17. In addition to briefing by the parties on the motion for reconsideration, amicus
briefs in support of reconsideration were submitted by the following:.
1. City Attorneys Richard Andrews, (Bellevue), Ralph Thomas (Kirkland),
Lawrence Warren (Renton), Saundra Driscoll (Kent), Marguerite Schellentrager
(Auburn).
2. The Association of Washington Cities. By separate order, the Washington
Association of Prosecuting Attorneys and Washington State Association of Counties
were allowed to join this Amicus brief.
3. William Stoebuck, Professor of Law, University of Washington.
These briefs are available from the Washington Supreme Court Clerk under
Docket No. 52877-2.
18. The Order Changing Opinion, stated:
The remedy we grant of invalidation of the ordinance is a remedy
consistent with the denial of substantive due process. Orion Corp. v. State, 109
Wash. 2d 621, 747 P.2d 1062 (1987). Overly severe landowner regulations have
previously resulted in our labeling those actions as "takings." Granat v.
Keasler,99 Wash. 2d 564, 663 P.2d 830 (1983).
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After setting the scene with a summary of federal and
Washington State regulatory taking law,1 9 this Article analyzes
and critically assesses Orion's ambitious doctrinal initiative in
light of the Allingham enigma2 0 and charts a tentative course
toward more coherent regulatory taking doctrine. 21 A pervasive and hopeful theme of the Article is that a latent, largely
unarticulated or misstated doctrine exists, just waiting for
explicit judicial recognition, that would consistently explain,
and even predict, most of the regulatory taking decisions.
II.

AN HISTORICAL SYNOPSIS OF REGULATORY TAKING LAW

The starting point in the exploration of regulatory taking
jurisprudence is the fifth amendment to the United States
Constitution, which provides in part: "nor shall private property be taken for a public use without just compensation." 2' 2
Although the fifth amendment applies only to the federal government, the taking limitation long has been held applicable to
state and local governments through the due process conduit of
the fourteenth amendment.23 In addition, all of the state constitutions contain identical or functionally equivalent proviTefdafederal taking clause, as interpreted by the
sions. 24 The
Supreme Court, establishes mandatory minimum limitations
on state and local governments that state constitutions, as
interpreted by the state courts, may exceed. Some state taking
provisions have been held to restrict state action more than
The Washington State taking
their federal counterpart.'
clause provides that "[n]o private property shall be taken or
Order Changing Opinion, supra note 14. Allingham, 109 Wash. 2d at 953 n.l., 749 P.2d
160, modified, 757 P.2d at 533 n.1.
19. See infra notes 22-193 and accompanying text.
20. See infra notes 355-400 and accompanying text.
21. See infra notes 324-54 and accompanying text.
22. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
23. See First English Evangelical Church v. Los Angeles County, 107 S. Ct. 2378,
2383 (1987); Webb's Fabulous Pharmacies, Inc. v. Beckwith, 449 U.S. 155, 160 (1980);
Chicago, Burlington & Quincy R.R. v. City of Chicago, 166 U.S. 226, 241 (1897).
Specific constitutional guarantees held to be incorporated into the due process
clause of the fourteenth amendment retain their specific identity. See, e.g., Mapp v.
Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
24. D. MANDELKER & R. CUNNINGHAM, PLANNING AND CONTROL OF LAND
Problems Pi(falls and A
DEVELOPMENT 50 (2d ed. 1985); Stoebuck, San Diego Gaa%&
Better Way, 25 J. URB. & CONTEMP. LAWS 3, 4 (1983).
25. See, e.g., Alderwood Assocs. v. Washington Envtl. Council, 96 Wash. 2d 230,
243, 635 P.2d 108, 115-16 (1981); Corrigan v. City of Scottsdale, 149 Ariz. 553, -, 720
P.2d 528, 540 (1985).
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damaged for public or private use without just compensation
having first been made.""6 Although the words "or damaged"
arguably make Washington's provision more restrictive than
the federal taking clause, no Washington decision has attached
significance to the difference in language in the context of
police power regulation.'
As the words of the taking clause plainly indicate, and as
constitutional history confirms, the limitation was aimed at
government expropriation of property.78 The taking clause,
while acknowledging the inherent governmental power of eminent domain, limits its exercise through the requirements of
"public use" and "just compensation."'
Judicial interpretations of these constitutional requirements, in the context of
government acquisition of property interests for various public
and quasi-public enterprises, constitute a well-established and
generally uncontroversial body of doctrine-the law of "eminent domain" or "condemnation."' 3
A branch of this doctrine, commonly called "inverse condemnation," recognizes the applicability of the constitutional
requirements to situations in which government actions, usually physically invasive, inadvertently or presumptuously
usurp property interests that should have been properly
acquired.3 ' Public flooding of privately owned land32 and
unreasonably disruptive government-sponsored aircraft overflights33 are examples. The condemnation is "inverse" because
§ 16.
27. See R. SETTLE, WASHINGTON LAND USE AND ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND
PRACTICE § 7.1. (1983) [herinafter SETLE]. One credible explanation of Allingham is
that the Washington Supreme Court, sub silentio, held the state taking clause to be
more restrictive than the federal taking clause. See infra text accompanying notes
351-52.
28. See generally F. BossELmAN, D. CALLiFS & J. BANTA, THE TAKING ISSUE
(1973) [hereinafter BOSSELMAN, CALLIES & BANTA].
29. U.S. CONST. amend. v.
30. See generally J. SACKMAN, NICHOLS' THE LAW OF EMINENT DOMAIN § 1.11 (rev.
3d ed. 1985); Stoebuck, A General Theory of Eminent Domain, 47 WASH. L. REV. 553
(1972).
31. See Highline School Dist. v. Port of Seattle, 87 Wash. 2d 6, 10-11, 548 P.2d 1085,
1088 (1976); Michelman, Property, Utility, and Fairness: Comments on the Ethical
Foundations of "Just Compensation" Law, 80 HARV. L. REv. 1165, 1184 (1967)
[hereinafter Michelman].
32. E.g., Pumpelly v. Green Bay Co., 80 U.S. (13 Wall) 166 (1871); Conger v. Pierce
County, 116 Wash. 27, 198 P. 377 (1921).
33. E.g., Griggs v. Allegheny County, 369 U.S. 84 (1962); United States v. Causby,
328 U.S. 256 (1946); Martin v. Port of Seattle, 64 Wash. 2d 309, 391 P.2d 540 (1964).
26. WASH. CONST. art. I,
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judicial determination of public use and just compensation follows rather than precedes the government invasion.
Late in the nineteenth century, landowners chafing under
burdensome state or local regulation began to argue that
severe limitations on their use of land were takings and, hence,
not constitutionally permissible without just compensation.
Even though such cases involved no government acquisition or
invasions of property, the courts were urged to focus on effect
rather than cause, and to characterize severe restrictions on
use, coupled with drastic reductions in property value, as takings. Thus, in the 1887 case of Mugler v. Kansas,3' brewery
owners used a regulatory taking theory to challenge a Kansas
statute prohibiting the manufacture of intoxicating liquors and
thereby greatly diminishing the value of their property. The
Supreme Court categorically rejected the theory as inapplicable to police power regulation. According to the Court, constitutional limitations on takings of property pertained only to
government acquisition or physical invasion of property under
the power of eminent domain:

[T]he present case must be governed by principles that
do not involve the power of eminent domain, in the exercise
of which property may not be taken for public use without
compensation. A prohibition simply upon the use of property for purposes that are declared, by valid legislation, to be
injurious to the health, morals, or safety of the community,
cannot, in any just sense, be deemed a taking or an appropriation of property for public benefit. Such legislation does not
disturb the owner in the control or use of his property for
lawful purposes, nor restrict his right to dispose of it, but is
only a declaration by the State that its use by anyone, for
purposes, is prejudicial to the public
certain forbidden
35
interests.

As police power regulation, the Kansas statute was subject to
the substantive due process requirement that it substantially
advance legitimate public interests, but not to the taking limitation. 36 For the next three decades the Supreme Court
adhered to this principle, deciding all regulatory taking challenges under vague standards of substantive due process.37
34. 123 U.S. 623 (1887).
35. 1& at 668-69.

36. 1&
37. See, e.g., Hadacheck v. Sebastian, 239 U.S. 394 (1915); Reinman v. City of Little
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It is important at this point to distinguish between function and form in assessing judicial reaction to the argument
that police power regulation may violate the Constitution by
excessively burdening private property. In all of the early
cases, the argument was asserted as a ground for invalidation
of the regulation rather than compensation.3s If the argument
succeeded, it was practically inconsequential to the property
owner whether the formal constitutional basis for invalidation
was the taking or due process clause. During the four decades
spanning the turn of the century, while formally rejecting the
applicability of the taking clause to police power regulation,
the Court functionally vacillated as to the existence of any
constitutional limitation on the extent to which government
regulation burdened property and redistributed wealth.3 9
According to most cases of this era, the Constitution required
only that regulatory means be rationally designed to serve
legitimate social ends, perhaps a rough measure of social efficiency, clearly not a limit on wealth redistribution. Police
power measures that plausibly advanced public interests satisfied substantive due process regardless of individual burdens
41
imposed.' As the Court noted in Hadacheck v. Sebastian:
It is to be remembered that we are dealing with one of the
most essential powers of government, one that is the least
limitable. It may, indeed, seem harsh in its exercise, usually
is on some individual, but the imperative necessity for its
existence precludes any limitation upon it when not exerted
arbitrarily.... There must be progress, and if in its march
private interests are in the way they must yield to the good
of the community. 2
Only in the 1894 case of Lawton v. Steele 43 did the Court
Rock, 237 U.S. 171 (1915); Lawton v. Steele, 152 U.S. 133 (1894). See Michelman, supra
note 31, at 1165, 1198, 1237, 1242-44.
38. See, e.g., Nectow v. City of Cambridge, 277 U.S. 183 (1928); Miller v. Schoene,
276 U.S. 272 (1928); Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926);
Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 (1922); Hadacheck, 239 U.S. 394;
Reinman, 237 U.S. 171; Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623 (1887); Lawton v. Steele, 152
U.S. 133 (1894).
39. See, e.g., Nectow, 227 U.S. 183; Miller, 276 U.S. 272; Euclid, 272 U.S. 365;
Hadacheck, 239 U.S. 394; Reinman, 237 U.S. 171; Mugler, 123 U.S. 623; Lawton, 152 U.S.
133.
40. Hadacheck, 239 U.S. 394, 410; Reinman, 237 U.S. 171, 177; Mugler, 123 U.S. 623,

668.
41. 239 U.S. 394 (1915).
42. Id. at 410.
43. 152 U.S. 133 (1894).
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recognize a constitutional limitation on the redistributive consequences of police power regulation. The Court acknowledged, in dicta, that even a regulation which substantially
served society would violate due process if "unduly oppressive
upon individuals.""
The modern era of regulatory taking law began in 1922
with the landmark decision of Pennsylvania Coal Co. v.
Mahon.45 In a terse opinion by Justice Holmes, without overruling or explicitly discrediting any prior decisions,6 the Court
invalidated a state statute, as applied, and, perhaps facially as
well,4 7 because of the unfair burden it imposed upon the holders of property rights to extract coal. Acknowledging that the
socially indispensable mission of the police power must not be
frustrated by solicitude for individual loss, the Court held that
there were ultimate constitutional limits on the extent of private burden to be endured for the public good.4 When the limits were exceeded, regulation became a taking.
Government hardly could go on if, to some extent, values incident to property could not be diminished without
paying for every such change in the general law. As long
recognized, some values are enjoyed under an implied limitation, and must yield to the police power. But obviously the
implied limitation must have its limits or the contract and
due process clauses are gone. One fact for consideration in
determining such limits is the extent of the diminution.
When it reaches a certain magnitude, in most if not in all
cases there must be an exercise of eminent domain and compensation to sustain the act. So the question depends upon
the particular facts. The greatest weight is given to the judgment of the legislature but it always is open to interested
44. Id. at 137.
45. 260 U.S. 393 (1922).
46. Justice Holmes stated: "But we regard this as going beyond any of the cases
decided by this court." Id. at 416.
47. Whether Pennsylvania Coal invalidated only a specific application of the
Kohler Act or the statute, on its face, was hotly contested by the majority and
dissenting opinions in Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470
(1987), in which the Court rejected a regulatory taking challenge of a statute very
similar to the Kohler Act. Id. at 493. Justice Stevens' characterization of the
Pennsylvania Coal holding has been called an "amazing reconstruction," Michelman,
Takings, 1987, 88 COLuM. L. REv. 1600 (1988), and "revisionist," Kmiec, The Original
UnderstandingOf The Taking Clause Is Neither Weak Nor Obtuse, 88 COLUM. L. REV.
1630, 1631 (1988) [hereinafter Kmiec].
48. Pennsylvania Coal, 260 U.S. at 416.
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parties to contend that the legislature has gone beyond its
constitutional power....
The general rule, at least, is that while property may be
regulated to a certain extent, if regulation goes too far it will
be recognized as a taking.4 9
Whether Justice Holmes was merely using the word "taking" metaphorically in adopting the theory that police power
regulation is subject to substantive due process limits on the
permissible extent of private burden imposed,' ° or was formally embracing the theory that police power regulation could
effect a taking subject to the compensation requirement of the
taking clause, itself, was unclear and has been debated ever
since.5 Holmes cited no authority for the proposition that
excessively burdensome regulation was a taking. Mugler v.
52
Kansas,
which had formally rejected the applicability of the
taking clause to police power regulation, was ignored, as was
Lawton v. Steele,5s which had recognized the "unduly oppressive" limitation of substantive due process. Holmes may have
meant that unfairly burdensome regulation that violates substantive due process is invalid, and may only be constitutionally effected through the power of eminent domain. Or he
may have meant that the regulation, since it had "very nearly
the same effect for constitutional purposes as appropriating or
destroying [the coal],' ' actually effected a taking within the
meaning of the taking clause, and hence, was invalid without
compensation.
PennsylvaniaCoal was unclear about both the formal constitutional basis and the operative standard by which the statute was held to have gone "too far." The extent of diminution
in property value caused by the regulation was deemed important but not determinative. 55 The Court variously suggested an
absolute standard of permissible diminution in property value5
49. Id., 260 U.S. at 413, 415.
50. See Lawton v. Steele, 152 U.S. 133 (1894).
51. See, e.g., Williamson County Regional Planning Comm'n v. Hamilton Bank,
473 U.S. 186, 197-98 (1985).

52. 123 U.S. 623 (1887).
53. 152 U.S. 133 (1894).
54. Pennsylvania Coal, 260 U.S. at 414.
55.
certain
domain
56.

Justice Holmes noted that "[w]hen [diminution in property value] reaches a
magnitude, in most if not all cases there must be an exercise of eminent
and compensation to sustain the act." Id at 413.
Id. If the standard was meant to be absolute, the permissible quantum of
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and a relative standard that called for balancing private loss
against the value of the public interest served. 57 Moreover, in
determining the permissibility of the private burden, offsetting
private benefits were to be taken into account.s
The chaotic jumble of conflicting uses left in the wake of
rapid urbanization induced New York City to adopt the
nation's first comprehensive zoning ordinance in 1916.1'
Within a decade, all but 5 states had enacted zoning enabling
6
acts and 420 municipalities had adopted zoning ordinances. 0
Landowners mounted numerous constitutional challenges of
the new regulatory regimes. Inspired by Pennsylvania Coal,
the regulatory taking argument was vigorously asserted. The
state courts were divided on the constitutional question when
Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co. 6 ' reached the Supreme
Court. 62 The federal district court had invalidated the zoning

ordinance as a violation of substantive due process for the taking of plaintiff's property without compensation.6 3 But the
Supreme Court ignored Pennsylvania Coal even though plaintiff alleged great diminution in land value. 64 The Court
property value diminution must have been great since the Court regarded "this as
going beyond any of the cases decided by this court." Id at 416. Recall that the Court
previously had upheld a regulation that reduced property value from $800,000 to
$60,000 in Hadacheck v. Sebastian, 239 U.S. 394 (1915).
57. Justice Holmes wrote:
No doubt there is a public interest even in this, as there is in every purchase
and sale and in all that happens within the commonwealth. Some existing
rights may be modified even in such a case. Rideout v. Knox, 148 Mass. 368,
19 N.E. 390, 2 A.L.R. 81, 12 Am. St. Rep. 560. But usually, in ordinary private
affairs, the public interest does not warrant much of this kind of interference.
Pennsylvania Coal, 260 U.S. at 413.
58. It is true that in Plymouth Coal Co. v. Pennsylvania, 232 U. S. 531, it was
held competent for the legislature to require a pillar of coal to be left along
the line of adjoining property, that, with the pillar on the other side of the
line, would be a barrier sufficient for the safety of the employees of either
mine in case the other should be abandoned and allowed to fill with water.
But that was a requirement for the safety of employees invited into the mine,
and it secured an average reciprocity of advantage that has been recognized as
a justification of various laws.
Pennsylvania Coal, 260 U.S. at 415.
59. See SErrLE, supra note 27, at 26; see generally S. ToLL, ZONED AMERICAN
(1969) [hereinafter TOLL].
60. SETrLE, supra note 27, at 26.
61. 272 U.S. 365 (1926).
62. For a detailed and provocative history of this litigation, see Tarlock, Euclid
Revisited, 34 LAND USE L. & ZONING DIG. 4, 6-8 (1982).
63. Ambler Realty Co. v. Village of Euclid, 297 F. 307, 317 (N.D. Ohio 1924).
64. As the Court noted in Euclid:
The [plaintiff's] bill alleges that the tract of land in question is vacant and has
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vaguely characterized plaintiff's challenge of zoning as
"attempted regulations under the guise of the police power,
which are unreasonable and confiscatory," 6 and upheld the
facial constitutionality of zoning since it was reasonably related
to proper public purposes.' Two years later, in Nectow v. City
of Cambridge,6 7 the Court, without casting any doubt on the
general validity of zoning, held that a zoning ordinance, as
applied to plaintiff's land, violated substantive due process.C
The Court simply reasoned that restricting to residential use a
lot utterly unsuited to that use seriously burdened plaintiff
without advancing any public interest.6 9
Thus, the foundation of modern regulatory taking law was
flimsy. Pennsylvania Coal7" had recognized that police power
regulation may be invalidated if it caused excessive depreciation of private property. But the formal constitutional basis
for this conclusion was unclear and controversial. 7 Was such
regulation invalid because it violated the substantive due process "unduly burdensome" 72 limitation, leaving the government free to pursue its regulatory objective through the power
been held for years for the purpose of selling and developing it for industrial
uses, for which it is especially adapted, being immediately in the path of
progressive industrial development; that for such uses it has a market value of
about $10,000 per acre, but if the use be limited to residential purposes the
market value is not in excess of $2,500 per acre; that the first 200 feet of the
parcel back from Euclid Avenue, if unrestricted in respect of use, has a value
of $150 per front foot, but if limited to residential uses, and ordinary
mercantile business be excluded therefrom, its value is not in excess of $50
per front foot.
Euclid, 272 U.S. at 384. (emphasis added).
65. Id. at 386-87.
66. During the next year, the Supreme Court in Miller v. Schoene, 276 U.S. 272
(1928), on the basis of similar reasoning, upheld a Virginia statute compelling the
removal of ornamental red cedar trees because they harbored cedar-rust, a disease
fatal to apple trees, which were of great commercial importance in Virginia. Although
the statute provided for recovery of any expense incurred in removing the cedars and
allowed the owner to use the fallen trees, it did not compensate the owners for the
standing value of the trees or the reduction in land value caused by their removal.
The Court held that the state's choice to preserve one class of property at the expense
of another was a permissible exercise of the police power. Id. at 279-81.
67. 277 U.S. 183 (1928).
68. Nectow, 277 U.S. at 188-89.
69. Id. at 188.
70. 260 U.S. 393 (1922).
71. See Williamson County Regional Planning Comm'n v. Hamilton Bank, 473
U.S. 172 (1985); Rose, Mahon Reconstructed Why The Takings Issue Is Still A Muddle,
57 S. CAL. L. REv. 561 (1984).
72. Lawton v. Steele, 152 U.S. 133, 137 (1894).
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of eminent domain in compliance with the taking clause?7" Or
was such regulation in itself a taking, temporary at least and
permanent if maintained, subject to inverse condemnation
remedies?74 Pennsylvania Coal did not explicitly disturb the
leading Mugler case,75 which had categorically rejected the propositions that police power regulation could effect a taking
subject to the taking clause and that the extent of private
property loss inflicted by a regulation that substantially served
a legitimate public interest was relevant to substantive due
process. 76 Moreover, the cases immediately following Pennsylvania Coal used the language and principles of Mugler and
its progeny without explicitly questioning or qualifying the
intervening Pennsylvania Coal opinion.7 7
Perhaps sensing the doctrine's shaky support, the
Supreme Court largely ignored the regulatory taking issue for
the next half century, leaving doctrinal development to the
state and lower federal courts.78
The Court's abstinence ended in 197871 in response to a
flood of litigation challenging a host of new land use and environmental laws spawned by the environmental movement.8 "
Landowners and developers generally have been reluctant to
sue government regulators. The delay and direct costs of litigation seldom have been worth enduring even when legal success was likely. Victories tended to be pyrrhic since the
traditional legal remedy merely invalidated the offending regulation, consigning the victorious challenger to run a slightly
73. See Hamilton Bank, 473 U.S. at 186, 197-98.
74. Id.
75. Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623 (1887).
76. Id. at 664, 668-69. Nor did Pennsylvania Coal express any doubts about other
decisions that had followed Mugler: Reinman v. City of Little Rock, 237 U.S. 171
(1915) and Hadacheck v. Sebastian, 239 U.S. 394 (1915).
77. See Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926); Miller v.
Schoene, 276 U.S. 272 (1928); Nectow v. City of Cambridge, 277 U.S. 183 (1928).
78. The silence was briefly broken in Goldblatt v. Town of Hempstead, 369 U.S.
590 (1962). In Goldblati, the Court perpetuated the doctrinal uncertainty by relying on
Mugler, 123 U.S. 623, Lawton v. Steele, 152 U.S. 133 (1894), Hadacheck, 239 U.S. 394,
and Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 (1922), without acknowledging their
inconsistencies. The Court used the language of both the taking and due process
clauses, without addressing their relative relationships to the police power, in
upholding the constitutionality of a local "safety" regulation of gravel mining because
the challenger had utterly failed to satisfy the burden of proof.
79. Penn Central Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104 (1978).
80. See generally, F. BOSSELMAN & D. CALLIEs, THE QUIET REVOLUTION iN LAND
USE CONTROL (1971).
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modified, sometimes less hospitable, regulatory gauntlet.8 l But
in the 1970s and 1980s, chafing under immensely intensified
regulatory burdens, landowners have turned more frequently
to the courts, and they have advocated more effective remedies."2 Recent regulatory taking claimants often have sought
damages rather than mere invalidationsm In response, an
increasingly sympathetic United States Supreme Court has
decided more regulatory taking cases in the last decade than in
the previous century.84 However, by the time the Supreme
81. See, e.g., Goldblatt v. Town of Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590 (1962); William C. Haas
& Co. v. City of San Francisco, 605 F.2d 1117 (9th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 928
(1980).
The famous Brennan dissent in San Diego Gas & Elec. Co. v. City of San Diego,
450 U.S. 621, 636-61 (1981), sympathized with the plight of a landowner limited to the
remedy of invalidation:
The instant litigation is a good case in point. The trial court, on April 9,
1976, found that the city's actions effected a "taking" of appellant's property
on June 19, 1973. If true, then appellant has been deprived of all beneficial
use of its property in violation of the Just Compensation Clause for the past
seven years.
Invalidation hardly prevents enactment of subsequent unconstitutional
regulations by the government entity. At the 1974 annual conference of the
National Institute of Municipal Law Officers in California, a California City
Attorney gave fellow City Attorneys the following advice:
"IF ALL ELSE FAILS, MERELY AMEND THE REGULATION AND
START OVER AGAIN.
"If legal preventive maintenance does not work, and you still receive a
claim attacking the land use regulation, or if you try the case and lose, don't
worry about it. All is not lost. One of the extra 'goodies' contained in the
recent [Californial Supreme Court case of Selby v. City of San Buenaventura,
10 C. 3d 110 [109 Cal. Rptr. 799, 514 P.2d 111 (1973)] appears to allow the City
to change the regulation in question, even after trial and judgment, make it
more reasonable, more restrictive, or whatever, and everybody starts over
again.
"See how easy it is to be a City Attorney. Sometimes you can lose the
battle and still win the war. Good luck." Longtin, Avoiding and Defending
Constitutional Attacks on Land Use Regulations (Including Inverse
Condemnation), in 38B NIMLO Municipal Law Review 192-93 (1975)
(emphasis in original).
San Diego Gas, 450 U.S. at 655-56 n.22 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
82. Kmiec, supra note 47, at 1661.
83. See, e.g., First English Evangelical Lutheran Church v. Los Angeles County,
107 S. Ct. 2378 (1987); MacDonald, Sommer & Frates v. Yolo County, 477 U.S. 340
(1986); Williamson County Regional Planning Comm'n v. Hamilton Bank, 473 U.S. 172
(1985); San Diego Gas, 450 U.S. 621; Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255 (1980); Penn
Central, 438 U.S. 104; Orion Corp. v. State, 109 Wash. 2d 621, 747 P.2d 1062, cert
denied, 108 S. Ct. 1996 (1988).
84. See, e.g., Pennell v. City of San Jose, 108 S. Ct. 849 (1988); Nollan v. California
Coastal Comm'n, 107 S. Ct. 3141 (1987); FirstEnglish, 107 S. Ct. 2378; Hodel v. Irving,
481 U.S. 704 (1987); Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. De Benedictis, 480 U.S. 470
(1987); Yolo County, 477 U.S. 340; Hamilton Bank, 473 U.S. 172; Ruckelshaus v.
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Court returned to the regulatory taking issue, the confusion
generated by the unexplained Mugler-PennsylvaniaCoal coexistence had been compounded. The state and lower federal
courts had taken widely divergent courses as they autonomously interpreted the federal constitution. 8
A.

The Recent Cases

The Supreme Court's decade of unprecedented devotion to
regulatory taking claims has been tantalizing but hardly productive of definitive doctrine. Some questions have been
resolved, but fundamental issues have been largely avoided.
We now know that the taking clause does apply to police
power regulation. 6 Thus, a landowner who has suffered a regulatory taking is entitled to compensation for property value
reduction during the period of the taking. s7 But the Court has
not provided significant guidance about-and, indeed, has
greatly oversimplified-the measure of compensation.'
Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986 (1984); Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp.,
458 U.S. 419 (1982); Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass'n, 452 U.S.
264 (1981); San Diego Gas, 450 U.S. 621; Webb's Fabulous Pharmacies, Inc. v. Beckwith,
449 U.S. 155 (1980); Agins, 447 U.S. 225; PruneYard Shopping Center v. Robins, 447
U.S. 74 (1980); Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164 (1979); Andrus v. Allard, 444
U.S. 51 (1979); Penn Central, 438 U.S. 104.
85. For examples in the area of wetland regulations challenged as regulatory
takings, compare Candlestick Properties, Inc. v. San Francisco Bay Conservation &
Dev. Comm'n., 11 Cal. App. 3d 557, 89 Cal. Rptr. 897 (1970); Dooley v. Town Plan. &
Zoning Comm'n of Town of Fairfield, 151 Conn. 304, 197 A.2d 770 (1964); State v. R.B.
Johnson, 265 A.2d 2711 (Me. 1970); Turnpike Realty Co. v. Town of Dedham, 362 Mass.
221, 284 N.E.2d 891 (1972); MacGibbon v. Board of Appeals, 356 Mass. 635, 255 N.E.2d
347 (1970); Morris County Land Improvement Co. v. Parsippany-Troy Hills Township,
40 N.J. 539, 193 A.2d 232 (1963); Department of Ecology v. Pacesetter Constr. Co., Inc.,
89 Wash. 2d 203, 571 P.2d 196 (1977); Maple Leaf Investors, Inc. v. Department of
Ecology, 88 Wash. 2d 726, 565 P.2d 1162 (1977); Just v. Marinette County, 56 Wis. 2d 7,
201 N.W.2d 761 (1972).
See generally, BOSSELMAN, CALLIES & BANTA, supra note 28.
86. FirstEnglish, 107 S. Ct. at 2386.
87. Id
88. See Herrington v. Sonoma County, 834 F.2d 1488, 1504 (9th Cir. 1987) (Setting
aside a $2,500,000 damage award, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals stated "[w]e
cannot allow the Herringtons to keep their property and be compensated in an amount
almost double the sale value of the property."); Wheeler v. City of Pleasant Grove, 833
F.2d 267 (11th Cir. 1987) (Setting aside a $1 award, the Eleventh Circuit Court of
Appeals held that the correct formula is loss in income-producing potential suffered
during the regulatory taking.); Yuba National Resources, Inc. v. United States, 821 F.2d
638, 640-42 (Fed. Cir. 1987) (Damages for a temporary taking measured by principles
normally governing the taking of a right to use property.); R. ELLICKSON & A.
TARLoCK, LAND-USE CONTROLS 168-72 (1981); Hagman, Temporary or InterimDamage
Awards in Land Use Control Cases, 4 ZONING & PLAN. L. REP. 129, 130-34 (1981);
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The recent cases, while acknowledging the potential applicability of both substantive due process and taking theory,
have not clarified their relative applicability or specific
requirements.8 9 The Court continues to recite vague standards,
muddling due process and taking terminology.9 There has
been no explanation of the substantive due process "unduly
oppressive" limitation. What constitutes a regulatory taking
continues to be "essentially [an] ad hoc, factual inquir[y]." 91
The relevant factors of economic impact, interference with distinct investment-backed expectations, and character of the governmental action, which can be traced to Pennsylvania Coal,9 2
are routinely mentioned but never significantly explained.9 3
Sometimes the Court seems to employ the so-called "balancing
test" of whether the regulation's public good outweighs its private harm, perhaps with the qualification that preventing serious harm to the public interest (especially nuisances) is much
weightier, perhaps conclusively so, than merely providing a
public amenity. 4 Sometimes the Court suggests a more absolute test, which depends only upon whether the regulation
serves a legitimate public interest and some minimum private
property value remains, regardless of the relative weight of the
public good and private harm. 95
In some of the recent regulatory taking cases, what the
Court actually does makes more sense than what it says it's
doing. That is, doctrine may be inferable from some of the
decisions even though it has not been fully articulated. This
seems to be so in the cases the Court has decided involving regulations that effect a physical invasion' of land or otherwise
Costonis, "Fair"Compensation and the Accommodation Power: Antidotes for the
Taking Impasse in Land Use Controversies,75 COLUM. L. REV. 1021 (1975).
89. See Williamson County Regional Planning Comm'n v. Hamilton Bank, 473
U.S. 172, 186, 197-99 (1985).
90. See, e.g., Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. De Benedictis, 480 U.S. 470 (1987).
91. Keystone, 480 U.S. at 495 (1987) (quoting Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444
U.S. 164, 175 (1979)); McDonald, Sommer & Frates v. Yolo County, 477 U.S. 340, 349
(1986) (quoting Kaiser Aetna); Penn Central Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S.
104, 124 (1978).
92. Pennsylvania Coal, 260 U.S. at 413-14.
93. See Keystone, 480 U.S. at 495; Yolo County, 477 U.S. at 349; Hamilton Bank, 473
U.S. at 191.
94. Keystone, 480 U.S. at 491 n.20; Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 261 (1980)
(the question of whether a taking has occurred "necessarily requires a weighing of
private and public interests").
95. See Agins, 447 U.S. at 262; Penn Central,438 U.S at 124.
96. Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 107 S. Ct. 3141 (1987); Hodel v. Irving,
481 U.S. 704 (1987); Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto, 467 U.S. 986 (1984); Loretto v.

1989]

Regulatory Taking Doctrine In Washington

effectively destroy one or more fundamental attributes of
property-the rights to possess, to exclude, and to dispose.
Such regulations are far more likely to be takings than regulations that only restrict use. Moreover, these regulatory taking
claims seem to be determined on the basis of implicit principles that are quite different and more predictive than the
vague considerations applicable to other regulatory taking
claims. 7 Of the eight recent Supreme Court cases involving
regulation of use, but not physical invasion or other deprivation of fundamental attributes of property ownership, none
was deemed a taking even though the restrictions on use were
often severe.9" In sharp contrast, of the eight recent cases
Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419 (1982); Webb's Fabulous
Pharmacies Inc. v. Beckwith, 449 U.S. 155 (1980); Prune Yard Shopping Center v.
Robbins, 447 U.S. 74 (1980); Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164 (1979). These
cases did not involve government acts that directly and affirmatively effected a
physical invasion as by building a dam that floods private land; such cases are resolved
by well-established inverse condemnation doctrines. Rather, these cases involve police
power regulation that indirectly brings about tangible interference with the right to
exclusive possession or other attributes of private property ownership as by compelling
a landowner to admit the public.
97. In Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419 (1982), the
court stated:
Although this Court's most recent cases have not addressed the precise
issue before us, they have emphasized that physical invasion cases are special
and have not repudiated the rule that any permanent physical occupation is a
taking.
Penn Central TransportationCo. v. New York City... contains one of the
most complete discussions of the Takings Clause. The Court explained that
resolving whether public action works a taking is ordinarily an ad hoc inquiry
in which several factors are particularly significant-the economic impact of
the regulation, the extent to which it interferes with investment-backed
expectations, and the character of the governmental action. 438 U.S. at 124.
The opinion does not repudiate the rule that a permanent physical occupation
is a government action of such a unique character that it is a taking without
regard to other factors that a court might ordinarily examine.
Loretto, 458 U.S. at 432 (emphasis added).
98. First English Evangelical Lutheran Church v. Los Angeles County, 107 S. Ct.
2378 (1987); Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470 (1987);
MacDonald, Sommers & Frates v. Yolo County, 477 U.S. 340 (1986); Williamson
County Regional Planning Comm'n v. Hamilton Bank, 473 U.S. 172 (1985); Hodel v.
Virginia Surface Mining and Reclamation Ass'n, 452 U.S. 264 (1981); San Diego Gas &
Elec. Co. v. City of San Diego, 450 U.S. 621 (1981); Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S.
255 (1980); Penn Central Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104 (1978). Another
recent regulatory taking case, Pennell v. City of San Jose, 108 S. Ct. 849 (1988), might
have been included in this category. Pennell involved a rent control ordinance
provision which required that the economic hardship of a landlord's tenants be
considered by the assigned regulatory official in determining permissible rents. The
facial challenge was rejected as "premature." See infra text accompanying notes 33334. So it is not known whether the direct regulations of economic return will be
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involving regulations interfering with fundamental property
rights to possess, exclude, and dispose, six were held to be takings even though the regulations caused only trivial reductions
in property value.9
Regulations that bar a landowner from excluding strangers or the general public seem to be presumptive takings.
Thus, a New York State statute that compelled landlords to
allow the installation of minor cable television facilities on
their buildings was a taking,"° as was a federal regulatory
requirement that a formerly nonnavigable, privately owned,
Hawaiian pond be opened to public navigation after it was connected to navigable waters.' 0 ' However, the per se rule of
Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp.,1 2 that regulations effecting permanent physical occupations, no matter
how trivial, are takings, is subject to an important qualification, unstated in Loretto, then recognized and applied in Nollan v. California Coastal Commission.0 3 As a prerequisite for
development permission, a regulation may require a landowner
to dedicate property rights for public use if the regulatory
exaction is reasonably calculated to prevent, or compensate for,
adverse public impacts of the proposed development.1°4 Since
the regulatory exaction of a lateral beach access easement in
Nollan was deemed not reasonably related to mitigating the
The Loretto
negative effects of development, it was a taking.'
rule is also subject to a vaguely explained exception whereby a
state law permitting the public to enter shopping centers to
decided on the basis of the implicit principles applicable to the deprivation of
fundamental attributes of ownership cases or restriction of use cases. Justice Scalia
(dissenting) advocated resolution on the basis of the Nollan principle proscribing
imposition of regulatory burdens disproportionate to the adverse impacts causally
related to the regulated activity. See Pennell, 108 S.Ct. at 862-63. For full exposition
and advocacy of this principle, see generally Kmiec, supra note 47. See also FCC v.
Florida Power Corp., 480 U.S. 245 (1987); Callies, supra note 1, at 606-07.
99. See Nollan, 107 S. Ct. 3141; Hodel, 481 U.S. 704; Ruckelshaus, 467 U.S. 986;
Loretto, 458 U.S. 419; Beckwith, 449 U.S. 155; Kaiser Aetna, 444 U.S. 164. Only in
Andrus v. Allard, 444 U.S. 51 (1979) and PruneYard Shopping Center v. Robins, 447
U.S. 74 (1980), were challenged regulations that deprived claimants of a fundamental
attribute of ownership not held to be takings.
100. Loretto, 458 U.S. 419.
101. Kaiser Aetna, 444 U.S. 164 (1979).
102. 458 U.S. at 426.
103. 107 S. Ct. 3141, 3145 (1987).
104. Nollan, 107 S. Ct. at 3146.
105. Id. at 3148-49.
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engage in "publicly expressive activity" was not a taking.106
While the Loretto per se rule also applies to regulatory dispossession of personal property, 0 7 it may not extend to lesser
attributes of personal property ownership, such as the right of
an owner to sell chattels. °8
The recent cases also provide significant guidance on the
threshold procedural issue of the justiciability of regulatory
takings."° When the challenged regulation restricts the use of
land, all opportunities for administrative relief or compensation, including available inverse condemnation actions in state
courts, must be pursued before a regulatory taking claim is
ripe for adjudication. 110 This ripeness requirement flows
directly from the vague, fact-intensive, regulatory taking standards applicable to police power regulations that merely
restrict use and do not effectively appropriate a fundamental
attribute of ownership."' Although the ripeness requirement
is sometimes stated in absolute terms, 112 the requirement generally is limited to "as applied" challenges" 3 and generally
106. PruneYard Shopping Center v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 83 (1980). See infira notes
286-87 and accompanying text.
107. See Hodel v. Irving, 481 U.S. 704 (1987); Webb's Fabulous Pharmacies Inc. v.
Beckwith, 449 U.S. 155 (1980).
108. See Andrus v. Allard, 444 U.S. 51 (1979). Andrus recently was qualified and
may have been discredited by -odel, 481 U.S. at 718-19 (Brennan, J., concurring and
Scalia, J., concurring.).
109. MacDonald, Sommer & Frates v. Yolo County, 477 U.S. 340 (1986);
Williamson County Regional Planning Comm'n. v. Hamilton Bank, 473 U.S. 172, 186
(1985); San Diego Gas & Elec. Co. v. City of San Diego, 450 U.S. 621, 633 (1981). See
infra notes 324-39 and accompanying text.
110. See supra note 109.
111. See supra notes 92-95 and accompanying text and infra notes 355-57 and
accompanying text.
112. See Hamilton Bank, 473 U.S. at 186 ("[A] claim that the application of
government regulations effects a taking of a property interest is not ripe until the
government entity charged with implementing the regulations has reached a final
decision regarding the application of the regulations to the property at issue.").
113. In Yolo County, the Court observed:
It follows from the nature of a regulatory takings claim that an essential
prerequisite to its assertion is a final and authoritative determination of the
type and intensity of development legally permitted on the subject property.
A court cannot determine whether a regulation has gone "too far" unless it
knows how far the regulation goes. As Justice Holmes emphasized
throughout his opinion for the Court in Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260
U.S. at 416, "this is a question of degree-and therefore cannot be disposed of
by general propositions." Accord, id., at 413. To this day we have no "set
formula to determine where regulation ends and taking begins." Goldblatt v.
Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590, 594 (1962). Instead, we rely "as much [on] the
exercise of judgment as [on] the application of logic." Andrus v. Allard, 444
U.S. 51, 65 (1979). Our cases have accordingly "examined the 'taking' question
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does not extend to "facial" regulatory taking claims." 4
B. Pre-OrionRegulatory Taking Doctrine in Washington
Until Orion, Washington regulatory taking law was unexceptional and consistent with the foregoing generalizations." 5
Substantive due process and taking limitations were routinely
muddled.1 1 6 In the absence of any meaningful rules and principles governing claims of unduly oppressive regulations or regulatory takings, ad hoc fact-based judgments guided by relevant
factors and vague tests have tended to prevail." 7 Regardless of
the doctrine articulated, regulations of use were never held to
9 while regulations that effecbe takings"' until Allingham,"1
tively usurped a landowner's fundamental property right to
possess, exclude others, and the like, often were considered
by engaging in essential ad hoc, factual inquiries that have identified several
factors-such as the economic impact of the regulation, its interference with
reasonable investment-backed expectations, and the character of the
governmental action-that have particular significance." Kaiser Aetna v.
United States, 444 U.S. at 175.
Yolo County, 477 U.S. at 348-49.
114. See Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470 (1987);
Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining and Reclamation Ass'n., 452 U.S. 264 (1981). But see
Pennell v. City of San Jose, 108 S. Ct. 849 (1988) (facial challenge of rent control
ordinance provision held to be unjustifiable as "premature," absent determination of
actual and specific regulatory burdens). See infra text accompanying notes 330-39.
115. See, e.g., Buttnick v. City of Seattle, 105 Wash. 2d 857, 719 P.2d 93 (1986); See
also SETLE,supra note 27, at 225-35.
116. E.g., Buttnick, 105 Wash. 2d 857, 861-62, 719 P.2d 93, 96-97 (1986); Granat v.
Keasler, 99 Wash. 2d 564, 568-70, 663 P.2d 830, 832-33 (1983); Department of Ecology v.
Pacesetter Constr. Co., 89 Wash. 2d 203, 210, 571 P.2d 196, 200-201 (1977). SETTLE,
supra note 27, at 233-34.
117. See, e.g., Buttnick, 105 Wash. 2d 857, 719 P.2d 93; Granat,99 Wash. 2d 564, 663
P.2d 830; PacesetterConstr., 89 Wash. 2d 203, 571 P.2d 196 (1977); Maple Leaf Investors,
Inc. v. Department of Ecology, 88 Wash. 2d 726, 565 P.2d 1162 (1977); Rains v.
Department of Fisheries, 89 Wash. 2d 740, 575 P.2d 1057 (1978); Cougar Business
Owners Ass'n. v. State, 97 Wash. 2d 466, 647 P.2d 481 (1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 971
(1983); Markham Advertising Co. v. State, 73 Wash. 2d 405, 439 P.2d 248 (1968).
118. See, e.g., Buttnick, 105 Wash. 2d 857, 719 P.2d 93 (historic district regulation);
Department of Natural Resources v. Thurston County, 92 Wash. 2d 656, 601 P.2d 494,
(1979) (subdivision regulation); Rains, 89 Wash. 2d 740, 575 P.2d 1057 (regulation of
habitat modification to protect fishery); PacesetterConstr., 89 Wash. 2d 203, 571 P.2d
196, (Shoreline Management Act); Maple Leaf Investors, 88 Wash. 2d 726, 565 P.2d 1162
(1977) (flood control); Lewis v. City of Medina, 87 Wash. 2d 19, 548 P.2d 1093 (1976)
(zoning); Markham Advertising, 73 Wash. 2d 405, 439 P.2d 248 (billboard regulation);
Carlson v. City of Bellevue, 73 Wash. 2d 41, 435 P.2d 957 (1968) (zoning); State v.
Dexter, 32 Wash. 2d 551, 202 P.2d 906 (1949) (forest practices); Mayer Built Homes, Inc.
v. Town of Steilacoom, 17 Wash. App. 558, 564 P.2d 1170 (1977) (zoning).
119. Allingham v. City of Seattle, 109 Wash. 2d 947, 749 P.2d 160 (1988).
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takings subject to qualifications'2 ° similar to those recognized
in the federal cases.' 2 ' Until Orion and Allingham, the Washington Supreme Court had not had occasion to apply the federal ripeness requirements. However, prior Washington case
law paralleled federal development of the ripeness principle. 122
III.
A.

THE ORION DOCTRINE

Factualand ProceduralBackground

Between 1963 and 1971 the Orion Corporation and Padilla
Bay Associates acquired outright or acquired options to
purchase most of the tidelands of 11,000-acre Padilla Bay, a
Puget Sound estuary of unsurpassed ecological significance.
Orion's plan was, by dredging and filling, to transform the tidelands into dry land fronting a network of navigable canals
which eventually would become a Venice-like community. 2 3
But Orion's dreams were soon shattered by a series of legal
events. In 1969, the Washington Supreme Court decided
Wilbour v. Gallagher,' 4 raising serious doubts about the legality of filling or other development of periodically submerged
lands that would interfere with public navigation and recreation. 25 The Wilbour case induced Governor Evans to impose a
moratorium on all tideland fill projects2 6 until the Shoreline
Management Act (SMA) was adopted in 1971.1' Convinced
120. Granat,99 Wash. 2d 564, 663 P.2d 830 (1983); Kennedy v. City of Seattle, 94
Wash. 2d 376, 617 P.2d 713 (1980); Unlimited v. Kitsap County, 50 Wash. App. 723, 750
P.2d 671 (1988); Martin v. City of Seattle, 46 Wash. App. 1, 728 P.2d 1091 (1986)
reversed on other grounds, 111 Wash. 2d 727, - P.2d - (1988); cf. In re Clinton Water
Dist., 36 Wash. 2d 284, 218 P.2d 309 (1950) (condemnation of water rights obligated
condemnor to compensate for riparian rights to be limited by regulations protective of
drinking water).
121. See supra text accompanying notes 96-108.
122. For example, Department of Natural Resources v. Thurston County, 92
Wash. 2d 656, 601 P.2d 494 (1979), is the Washington State equivalent of Penn Central
Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104 (1978), and Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447
U.S. 255 (1980). These cases established the principle that assertions that regulations
effected takings as applied to claimants would be deferentially reviewed as facial
challenges. See infra notes 299-311 and accompanying text.
123. The aptness of a Venice analogy, used throughout the protracted Orion
litigation, is unknown since no actual development proposal was ever made. See Orion
II, 109 Wash. 2d at 626, 747 P.2d at 1065; Orion Corp. v. State, 103 Wash. 2d 441, 444, 693
P.2d 1369, 1372 (1985) [hereinafter Orion 1].
124. 77 Wash. 2d 306, 462 P.2d 232 (1969), cert denied, 400 U.S. 878 (1970).
125. See Wilbour, 77 Wash. 2d at 316, 462 P.2d at 238-39.
126. Orion II, 109 Wash. 2d at 627, 747 P.2d at 1066.
127. WASH. REV. CODE § § 90.58.010-.930 (1987). See generally SErLE, supra note
27, at 129-63; Chapman, Substantive Decisionnaking Under The Washington
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that the SMA precluded the contemplated development, Orion
considered and rejected several aquaculture ventures and a
state offer to purchase the tidelands. By 1976 the State
Department of Ecology (DOE) had formally approved the Skagit County Shoreline Management
Master Program
(SCSMMP)1 28 as a state regulation pursuant to the SMA.'
The SCSMMP, like its parent SMA and the SMA regulations,
precluded dredging and filling of Orion's tidelands. 1 0 As
potentially permissible aquaculture seemed economically unattractive, 3 1 Orion further explored possible sale of its tidelands
but ultimately rejected purchase offers by the State and the
Nature Conservancy. 3 2 In 1980, the State enacted legislation
133
creating the Padilla Bay Estuarine Sanctuary (Sanctuary),
which authorized State purchase, but did not attempt to regulate the use of privately owned Padilla Bay tidelands.' 34 Orion
never applied for any permits to use or develop its tideland
Shoreline Management Act, 9 U. PUGET SOUND L. REv. 337 (1986); Crooks, The
Washington Shoreline ManagementAct of 1971, 49 WASH. L. REv. 423 (1974).
128. Pursuant to WASH. REV. CODE § 90.58.090 (1987), local "master programs,"
which implement the policies and requirements of the SMA, must be approved, or
adopted in cases of local default, by the State Department of Ecology. When approved
or adopted, local master programs become state regulations.
129. The State's formal approval of the Skagit County Shoreline Management
Master Program on October 5, 1976, was codified at WASH. ADMIN. CODE § 173-19-370
(1986).
130. See SCSMMP §§ 7.03(2)(A)(6), (B)(1), 7.13(2)(A)(6); Orion II, 109 Wash. 2d at
628-29, 747 P.2d at 1066-67; Orion I, 103 Wash. 2d at 447-49, 693 P.2d at 1373-74.
131. Orion II, 109 Wash. 2d at 629, 747 P.2d at 1067; Orion 1, 103 Wash. 2d at 450,
693 P.2d at 1375.
132. Orion II, 109 Wash. 2d at 629-630, 747 P.2d at 1067-68.
133. Act of April 4, 1980, ch. 180, § 1, 1980 Wash. Laws 610.
134. Id. The legislation authorized State purchase of Padilla Bay tidelands to
establish an "estuarine sanctuary." The only reference to regulation of tideland use in
the enactment pertained to the regulation of private use of publicly owned tidelands
after they had been acquired:
For the purpose of establishing an estuarine sanctuary in Padilla Bay,
Skagit county [sic], there is appropriated from the general fund to the
department of ecology [sic] for the biennium ending June 30, 1981, the sum of
seventy thousand dollars, or so much thereof as may be necessary. The
department of ecology may use such funds for the acquisition of tidelands
within Padilla Bay, Skagit county [sic], either through direct expenditures or
through grants to a federal, state, or local agency and for administering the
establishment of an estuarine sanctuary in Padilla Bay, Skagit County.
No moneys appropriated under this section may be used by the
department of ecology [sic] for acquisition of tidelands unless made in
combination with an equal match of moneys from other public or private
sources.

Prior to acquiring any tidelands, the department of ecology [sic] shall
determine that the use of the property to be acquired will be consistent with
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holdings. 135
In 1982, Orion sued the State and Skagit County seeking
damages for inverse condemnation; Orion contended that State
and County SMA regulations had unconstitutionally taken its
tidelands without just compensation. 3 Orion also claimed a
taking by physical invasion, a taking by oppressive preacquisition conduct, and a violation of its federal civil rights3 7 under
section 1983 of the Civil Rights Act.138 The State and County
challenged Orion's right to assert these claims because Orion
had not exhausted its administrative remedies by seeking regulatory permission to use or develop its tidelands. This issue
ultimately was decided in favor of Orion in the 1985 decision,
Orion Corp. v. State,13 wherein the court held that Orion was
not required to seek permits under the futility exception to the
exhaustion of remedies rule.
On remand, the superior court resolved numerous issues
by summary judgment, the appeals of which were decided in
the 1988 landmark case of Orion Corp. v. State."4 In Orion,
chapter 90.58 RCW, the shoreline management act, [sic] and the guidelines
and master programs adopted thereunder.
Hunting, fishing, boating and noncommercial taking of shellfish shall be
authorized but shall be regulated on properties acquired under this section or
as a result of the passage of this section.
Id.
135. Orion II, 109 Wash. 2d at 631-33, 747 P.2d at 1068-69; Orion I, 103 Wash. 2d at
455-60, 693 P.2d at 1377-80.
136. Orion sought the remedy of inverse condemnation damages to compensate for
the alleged regulatory taking. Orion II, 109 Wash. 2d at 630, 747 P.2d at 1067.
137. Id.
138. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1982).
139. Orion 1, 103 Wash. 2d 441, 693 P.2d 1369 (1985).
140. Orion I, 109 Wash. 2d 621, 747 P.2d 1062 (1987), cert denied, 108 S. Ct. 1996
(1988). The court decided a number of significant procedural and preliminary
substantive issues related to the taking claim, which may be summarized as follows:
(1) The trial court's rejection of the contention that the regulatory taking claim
was not ripe for judicial determination was affirmed by the supreme court. Id. at 63334, 747 P.2d at 1069. The ripeness prerequisite, as articulated by the United States
Supreme Court in two cases decided after Orion 1, MacDonald, Sommer & Frates v.
Yolo County, 477 U.S. 340 (1986) and Williamson County Regional Planning Comm'n.
v. Hamilton Bank, 473 U.S. 172 (1985), is a difficult hurdle to overcome and is to be
distinguished from the exhaustion of remedies requirement. In Orion I, the court held
exhaustion unnecessary as futile, reasoning that the only plausibly permissible
profitable use under SMA regulation was aquaculture but that a conditional use
permit for aquaculture would be unobtainable because it would be incompatible with
the adjacent sanctuary. Orion 1, 103 Wash. 2d at 458-60, 693 P.2d at 1379-80. In Orion
II, notwithstanding new evidence and argument that aquaculture would be permitted,
the court held the regulatory taking sufficiently ripe for review. Orion II, 109 Wash.
2d at 633, 747 P.2d at 1069.
(2) Once it had been determined that compensatory damages are a remedy for
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the trial court's dismissal of all but the regulatory taking claim
was affirmed. The supreme court briefly explained that there
was no basis for the claims of taking by physical invasion and
oppressive preacquisition conduct and that the federal civil
rights claim was not ripe for adjudication until Orion had fully
pursued recovery of compensation for a regulatory taking. 4 '
regulatory takings, see First English Evangelical Lutheran Church v. Los Angeles
County, 107 S. Ct. 2378 (1987), the courts have had to address the issue of what
limitation period, if any, applies. The trial court's refusal to dismiss for untimeliness
was affirmed. The court acknowledged that a limitation should apply, but avoided a
determination of the applicable period because the action was brought within the
shortest period (three years) asserted. Orion II, 109 Wash. 2d at 634-35, 747 P.2d at
1069-70.
(3) The trial court's refusal to dismiss the regulatory taking claim for Orion's
failure to join the federal government as an indispensable party also was affirmed. Id.
at 635, 747 P.2d at 1070. Assuming, arguendo, that federal regulatory requirements
would have precluded any profitable use of the tidelands even if state and local
regulation had not, making the federal government an indispensable party, the court
held that joinder was not required. Id. The court reasoned that since there was no
court in which federal, state, and local government could be joined, mandatory joinder
would deprive Orion of a forum. Id
(4) Padilla Bay Associates (PBA) was an entity to which Orion had transferred its
options. Id. at 636-37, 747 P.2d at 1070-71. The trial court's dismissal of PBA's taking
claim was affirmed. Id. at 637, 747 P.2d at 1071. Under the circumstances, PBA's
unexercised options were an insufficient interest in the tidelands to confer standing.
Id.
(5) The court upheld the admission of expert testimony of a law professor on the
history of shoreline regulation in Washington. Id. at 637-38, 747 P.2d at 1071. The
testimony was offered in relation to Orion's reasonable development expectations as it
was acquiring the tidelands and the regulatory relationship of the state and county. Id.
(6) Since only private property may be "taken," and the public trust doctrine
limits private property rights to use submerged land, the doctrine's applicability to
Orion's tidelands was critical to resolution of the taking claim. Id. at 638-42, 747 P.2d
at 1071-73. The court held that tidelands were subject to the doctrine and, even after
conveyance into private ownership, remained subject to public rights which go beyond
navigation to fishing and recreation and perhaps further. Id. at 640-41, 747 P.2d at
1073. The court held that dredging and filling the tidelands were precluded by the
doctrine and remanded for determination of whether any possible, reasonably
profitable private use was permissible. Id. at 641-42, 747 P.2d at 1073. See infra note
197 and accompanying text.
(7) The trial court had rejected the county's motion to dismiss the County as a
party on the ground that its regulatory role was subordinate to the State's. The
supreme court reversed, dismissing the County, reasoning that the County shorelines
master program was mandated by the SMA, prepared under the direction and control
of The Department of Ecology (DOE), and formally adopted as a state administrative
regulation. Id. at 643, 747 P.2d at 1074. The court characterized the County as a mere
agent of the State and hence not legally responsible for any taking. Id. at 643-44, 747
P.2d at 1074.
(8) The court, without explanation, rejected the State's argument that it could not
have effected a regulatory taking because DOE had no power of eminent domain
under the SMA. Id. at 644, 747 P.2d at 1074-75.
141. Orion II, 109 Wash. 2d at 670-73, 747 P.2d at 1088-89.
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The trial court's summary judgment ruling that state and
county regulation effected a permanent taking entitling Orion
to compensation was reversed on several grounds and
remanded for trial of factual issues necessary to ultimately
resolve the regulatory taking claim."
The Washington Supreme Court, while pondering the
arguments on the taking issue in Orion, lamented the haphazard state of the law. 14 3 Rather than taking refuge in the traditional question-begging rationalization that doctrine is
unnecessary because each case must be decided on its own
facts,'" the court eschewed the time-honored practice of ignoring the doctrinal chasms and contradictions 145 and set out to
rebuild regulatory taking law from the ground up. This ambitious enterprise was complicated by the fact that federal regulatory taking doctrine, binding upon the states, is not a
snapshot but a motion picture. During the period between oral
argument and the ultimate decision in the Orion case, the
United States Supreme Court had issued three major regulatory taking decisions. 146
The process the court employed in its reassessment and
reconstruction of regulatory taking doctrine was unusual.147 It

began with an exegesis of state and federal case law on the relative applicability, requirements, and remedial consequences of
the substantive due process and taking limitations on police
power regulation. 14 Concluding that the significant remedial
differences of substantive due process violations and regulatory
takings necessitated doctrinal clarification of their respective
applicability and requirements, the court set forth a proposal.
Relying on a revisionist interpretation of Washington case
law,149 and striving for an optimal policy reconciliation of com142. Id. at 668-70, 747 P.2d at 1087.
143. Ii at 645-49, 747 P.2d at 1075-77; see supra text accompanying notes 1-85 and
104-07.
144. See supra notes 4-5, 117 and accompanying text.
145. The most obvious of which are the product of the unexplained coexistence of
Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 723 (1887) and Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S.
393 (1922). See supra notes 39-50.
146. Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 107 S. Ct. 3141 (1987); First English
Evangelical Lutheran Church v. County of Los Angeles, 107 S. Ct. 2378 (1987);
Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470 (1987).
147. Apparently the court's unusual analytical sequence resulted from the
intervention of Nollan, First English, and Keystone, after the opinion had been
substantially formulated. See Orion II, 109 Wash. 2d at 653-58, 747 P.2d at 1079-82.
148. Orion II, 109 Wash. 2d at 644-51, 747 P.2d at 1075-78.
149. See id. at 650-51, 747 P.2d at 1078. My search through the cited cases has
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peting claims of land development and environmental quality
interests, the court stated what it apparently regarded as ideal
rules. The court specified the proper division of labor between
the substantive due process and regulatory taking limitations
and highlighted their respective requirements. But since the
federal constitution establishes minimum limitations on the
police power, which states may not reduce, the court acknowledged that its prerogative was limited. And, after reflection,
the court concluded that several elements of the proposed ideal
doctrine did seem less restrictive than the United States
Supreme Court's preemptive pronouncements. So these differences, which were characterized as more linguistic than substantive, were eliminated by revisions of the ideal doctrine,"S
and the revised doctrine was applied to the regulatory taking
issues of Orion.15 '
B.

Doctrinal Overview of Orion

The Washington Supreme Court's elaborate regulatory
taking doctrine and decision in Orion,5 2 determined through
the reasoning process just described, can be paraphrased as follows: The extent to which government may burden private
property owners economically is potentially governed by both
the substantive due process and compensation for taking
requirements of federal and state constitutions. Under both
federal and state case law, however, there is unresolved conflicting authority on whether police power regulation is subject
only to the substantive due process requirement or to the taking limitation as well. But, while vague, the two constitutional
requirements are essentially the same. They both require regproduced no support for the court's characterization of prior Washington case law as
having "harmoniz[ed] Pennsylvania Coal and Mugler" and as having "implicitly
recognized a dividing line between land-use regulations that deprive property rights
without due process and land-use regulations that go one step further to effect a
compensable taking." Id, at 651, 747 P.2d at 1078.
150. Id. at 652-62, 747 P.2d at 1079-84.
151. Id. at 662-70, 747 P.2d at 1084-88.
152. Other procedural and substantive issues decided are beyond the scope of this
Article except to the extent that they are intertwined with the applicability of the
taking limitation to state regulation of Orion's tidelands and the standards governing
resolution of the regulatory taking claim for inverse condemnation damages. See
supra note 129. See also Settle, Regulatory Takings, Shoreline Management, and The
Public Trust Doctrine, ENVTL. & LAND USE L. NEwSL., Apr. 1988, at 1; Settle,
Regulatory Takings, the Public Trust Doctrine, Odds and Ends, 1988 ENVTL. & LAND
USE L. SEM. 3A-18.
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ulatory reasonableness. 15 3 So does it really matter whether the
taking clause limits the police power? Yes, because the remedy for a due process violation is merely invalidation, while the
remedy for a taking is compensatory damages.'54 This difference in remedy is immensely important to both private property owners and government regulators. The compensation
remedy more effectively protects private property rights but
sacrifices public interests by its chilling effect on government
regulation.
Ideally, if we (the Washington Supreme Court) were writing on a clean slate and had the last word, competing private
property and public social and environmental interests would
be reconciled by the rule that the taking clause and its compensation remedy would apply only to police power regulation
that goes "beyond preventing harm to actually enhance a publicly owned right in land";"5 other police power regulation
would be subject only to substantive due process and its invalidation remedy." However, we are not writing on a clean slate
and do not have the last word. The United States Supreme
Court's regulatory taking doctrine is binding upon the states 5 7
and, taken literally, is inconsistent with our ideal regulatory
taking doctrine. 6 5 But the federal differences-(1) taking
clause applicability is not limited to police power measures
that go "beyond preventing harm to actually enhance a publicly owned right in land,"'15 9 and, (2) substantive due process
0
and taking standards of reasonableness are not identical 16 are quite readily reconcilable with our ideal doctrine. While
federal doctrine does not explicitly limit applicability of the
taking clause, effectively it does the same thing by "insulating"
from the taking limitation regulations preventing harm to
important public interests.161 Such regulations are subject only
153. Orion II, 109 Wash. 2d at 648, 747 P.2d at 1077.
154. Id.
155. IMLat 651, 747 P.2d at 1078. The cases cited by the court in support of this
principle do not explicitly rely on it. Rather, they employ vague, multi-factor
reasoning.

156. Id.
157. First English Evangelical Lutheran Church v. Los Angeles County, 107 S. Ct.
2378 (1987); Webb's Fabulous Pharmacies, Inc. v. Beckwith, 449 U.S. 155 (1980);
Chicago, Burlington & Quincy R.R. v. City of Chicago, 166 U.S. 226 (1897).
158. Orion II, 109 Wash. 2d at 657, 747 P.2d at 1081.
159. IM at 653-55, 747 P.2d at 1079-80.
160. Id. at 654, 747 P.2d at 1080; see Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 107 S.
Ct. 3141, 3147 n.3 (1987).
161. See, e.g., Keystone Bituminious Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470, 485-
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to invalidation under substantive due process. 1 62 The recon163
ciled regulatory taking doctrine involves a two-step test
and a heavy burden of overcoming the presumption of
constitutionality."6

First, is the regulation "insulated" from the taking limitation as a public harm prevention measure? If so, it remains
subject to substantive due process limitations. 16 5 Second, if not,
(a) does the regulation fail to substantially advance legitimate
state interests, or (b) is the regulation's adverse economic
impact on the property owner excessive?"6 Since Orion's proposed tideland development by dredging and filling was precluded by the public trust doctrine, and hence was not within
Orion's private property rights, this restriction was subject to
neither substantive due process nor taking limitations. 6 7 The
502 (1987) (statute intended to safeguard public interest in health, the environment
and the fiscal integrity of the area-held not to constitute a taking).
162. Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623, 668-69 (1887).
163. Orion II, 109 Wash. 2d at 655-56, 747 P.2d at 1080-81.
164. FirstEnglish, 107 S. Ct. at 2392.
165. See infra notes 222-23 and accompanying text.
166. See FirstEnglish, 107 S. Ct. at 2388-89; Keystone, 480 U.S. at 497; Agins v.
City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 260 (1980); Nectow v. City of Cambridge, 227 U.S. 183, 188
(1928); Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 413-14 (1922).
167. Orion II, 109 Wash. 2d at 638-43, 747 P.2d at 1071-74. Since only private
property may be "taken," and the public trust doctrine limits private property rights to
use land submerged by navigable waters, the doctrine's applicability to Orion's
tidelands was critically important to resolution of the taking claim. The court held
that tidelands were subject to public rights, which go beyond navigation to fishing and
recreation, and perhaps further. Id. at 641, 747 P.2d at 1073. The court held that
dredging and filling the tidelands were precluded by the doctrine and remanded to the
trial court for determination of whether any possible, reasonably profitable private use
not dependent on dredging and filling was permissible under the public trust doctrine.
Id. at 673, 747 P.2d at 1089. The court categorically rejected Orion's arguments that
Wilbour v. Gallagher, 77 Wash. 2d 306, 462 P.2d 232 (1969), cert denied, 400 U.S. 878
(1970), was not based on the public trust doctrine and that the doctrine did not even
exist in Washington. See Orion II, 109 Wash. 2d at 641, 747 P.2d at 1073. There could
be no doubt about its existence after the court's recent sweeping exposition of the
doctrine in Caminiti v. Boyle, 107 Wash. 2d 662, 732 P.2d 989 (1987). And while in
Wilbour the court did not use the words "public trust doctrine," we now know that is
what it meant. See Orion II, 109 Wash. 2d at 641, 747 P.2d at 1073. In Caminiti, the
court explained the two effects of the doctrine. First, it is a legal limitation on the
disposition of lands underlying navigable waters by state government. Caminiti, 107
Wash. 2d at 672, 732 P.2d at 995. Second, it is a legal servitude, for the benefit of the
public, upon such lands after they have been conveyed into private ownership unless
the servitude has been consciously and legally extinguished by the State. Id. at 674,
732 P.2d at 996. Caminitiinvolved the former effect. Id. at 677, 732 P.2d at 998. Orion
II involved the latter. Orion II, 109 Wash. 2d at 663-65, 747 P.2d at 1084-85. The Orion
rI court analogized the public trust servitude to a covenant running with the land. Id.
at 640, 747 P.2d at 1073-74. Thus Orion, in purchasing privately owned tidelands
previously conveyed by the State, could obtain no more than Orion's grantor held;
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SMA and SCSMMP, as "public health and safety regulations"
were insulated from the taking limitation and subject only to
substantive due process limitations. But the sanctuary designation, which (according to the Court's highly questionable
assumptions) precluded the permissibility of aquaculture under
the SMA and SCSMMP, was not insulated from the taking
clause because its purpose was not to prevent harm to important public interests but "to protect the preexisting [public]
uses in the area.""' Thus, applicability of the taking limitation
depends upon whether aquaculture was precluded by (a) the
public trust doctrine, (b) the SMA and SCSMMP alone (and
thus insulated), or (c) the SMA and SCSMMP in combination
with the sanctuary designation (and thus not insulated), which
must be determined by the trial court upon remand. Only if it
is determined that the uninsulated sanctuary designation was a
sine qua non of aquaculture preclusion does the taking limitation apply, necessitating the second step of the test. The sanctuary does satisfy the first element of the regulatory taking
test. It does substantially advance a legitimate public interest.
But the excessive economic deprivation element of the test
depends upon factual issues that must be determined upon
remand. The economic burden would not constitute a taking if
the trial court were to determine that either some reasonably
profitable use remained or a nongovernmental buyer (e.g., the
tidelands subject to the public trust servitude. Id. The court acknowledged that early
this century the State extensively conveyed and encouraged the filling and diking of
tidelands and that such conveyances in some cases may have extinguished public trust:
We do not mean to suggest that once the state conveys to a private party
property subject to trust the property will always be burdened by trust
requirements. For example, the California Supreme Court has held that
although the trust originally applied to all tidelands in the San Francisco Bay,
properties already dredged and filled under earlier grants were no longer
subject to the trust. Berkeley v. Superior Court, 26 Cal. 3d 515, 606 P.2d 362,
162 Cal. Rptr. 327, cert. denied, Santa Fe Land Improvement Co. v. Berkeley,
449 U.S. 840, 66 L. Ed. 2d 48, 101 S. Ct. 119 (1980). In reaching its decision, the
California court stated that "the principle we apply is that the interests of the
public are paramount in property that is still physically adaptable for trust
uses, whereas the interests of the grantees and their successors should prevail
insofar as the tidelands have been rendered substantially valueless for those
purposes. Berkeley, 26 Cal. 3d at 534, 606 P.2d 362, 162 Cal. Rptr. 327.
Orion II, 109 Wash. 2d at 640 n.9, 747 P.2d at 1072-73 n.9.
Thus, it appears that the public trust may be extinguished in either of two ways:
first, if such lands have been physically irreversibly altered in good faith pursuant to
early conveyances so that they no longer could serve public trust purposes; and second,
if the State deliberately makes a legislative choice to extinguish public rights and this
choice satisfied the test of Caminiti.
168. Orion II, 109 Wash. 2d at 659-62, 747 P.2d at 1082-84.
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Nature Conservancy) was willing to pay a price that assumed a
reasonably profitable use. Even if a taking occurred, there was
no violation of the compensation for taking requirement if the
just comamount of the State's offer to purchase constituted
16 9
pensation; this was to be determined on remand.
C. The Respective Realms of Substantive Due Process and
Regulatory Takings
The major doctrinal initiative of the Washington Supreme
Court in Orion was to reject emphatically the virtually universal American judicial practice of ignoring, or vaguely acknowledging and muddling, the relative applicability of substantive
due process and taking limitations as constitutional measures
of the permissible extent of private burden imposed by police
power regulation. As long as the two limitations were amorphously similar and claimants sought only the remedy of invalidation, the lack of doctrinal precision was disappointing but
tolerable. But in the last decade, as a result of the unprecedented intensification of land use regulation in the 1970s, 7 °
landowners and public regulators have pressed the courts for
clearer guidance regarding the constitutional limits. Landowners' claims of excessively burdensome regulation often have
sought inverse condemnation damages. 171 Consequently,
explicit demarcation of the respective realms, requirements,
and remedies of the due process and taking limitations has
become not merely a matter of legal tidiness but indispensable
to principled constitutional adjudication.
In Orion, it was the "crucial difference... in the remedy
to be applied-invalidation or the payment of just compensation"'17--that motivated the court to make a precise determination of the relative applicability of due process and taking
limitations. 17 3 Regulatory takings are retrospective only. The
constitutionally required compensation is for a temporary tak169. Id. at 669-70, 747 P.2d at 1087-88.
170. See supra notes 79-84.
171. Although the court did not actually say so at this point in the opinion, it
correctly indicated elsewhere that the remedy of compensation for a regulatory taking
is not in conflict with the remedy of invalidation for violation of substantive due
process. So a regulation might be held to violate both the taking and due process
requirements without incompatible remedial consequence. See supra text
accompanying notes 75-76.
172. Orion II, 109 Wash. 2d at 649, 747 P.2d at 1077.
173. Id. at 654 n.22, 747 P.2d at 1080 n.22.
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ing, for the period the regulation was in effect.' 7 4 If, upon the
adjudication of a taking, the government chooses to repeal or
amend the regulation or eliminate the features that effect a
taking, the taking terminates.'7 5 Only if government elects to
maintain the regulation do the taking and the compensation
requirement become prospective. 176 In short, judicial determination that a regulation is a taking effectively concedes that
the regulation has temporarily inversely condemned property,
which may not be accomplished through the police power
unless accompanied by just compensation; compensation is
required retrospectively, at least, and prospectively if the regulation is retained. 7 7 So, in effect, a regulatory taking determination prospectively invalidates the regulation subject to the
contingency that the invalidity may be avoided by compensation. 17 If the regulatory authority has no power of eminent
domain or otherwise would be precluded from exercising the
power of eminent domain to perpetuate the regulatory taking,
then the contingency could not occur and the prospective
179
invalidation would be absolute.
Judicial invalidation of a police power measure for violation of substantive due process rights would have the same pro174. Id. at 668-70, 747 P.2d at 1087-88.
175. I&; see also First English Evangelical Luthern Church v. Los Angeles County,
107 S. Ct. 2378 (1987), in which the Court stated:
Nothing we say today is intended to abrogate the principle that the
decision to exercise the power of eminent domain is a legislative function,
"'for Congress and Congress alone to determine."' Hawaii Housing
Authority v. Midkif, 467 U.S. 229, 240, 104 S. Ct. 2321, 2329, 81 L. Ed. 2d 186
(1984), quoting Berman v. Parker,348 U.S. 26, 33, 75 S. Ct. 98, 103, 99 L. Ed. 2d
27 (1954). Once a court determines that a taking has occurred, the
government retains the whole range of options already available--amendment
of the regulation, withdrawal of the invalidated regulation, or exercise of
eminent domain. Thus we do not, as the Solicitor General suggests, "permit a
court, at the behest of a private person, to require the . . . Government to
exercise the power of eminent domain .... ." Brief for United States as
Amicus Curiae 22. We merely hold that where the government's activities
have already worked a taking of all use of property, no subsequent action by
the government can relieve it of the duty to provide compensation for the
period during which the taking was effective.
FirstEnglish, 107 S.Ct. at 2389.
176. Orion II, 109 Wash. 2d at 668-70, 747 P.2d 1062, 1087-88.
177. Id.
178. Id.
179. Although the precise issue apparently has not been decided, this rule would
seem inevitable. Otherwise, a government agency lacking the power of eminent
domain might effectively abrogate the power by adopting and maintaining regulations
held to be regulatory takings.
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spective effect as a regulatory taking determination 8 0 Due
process invalidation is effectively subject to the qualification
that the invalidation may be avoided if the regulatory government elects to compensate for the otherwise impermissible
burden through proper exercise of the power of eminent
domain.'"' Retrospectively, the due process and taking remedies differ, but not as much as Orion suggests." 2 Although
invalidation for violation of substantive due process does not
directly require compensation for the period the regulation
was in effect, compensation may be indirectly compelled
through a section 198383 federal civil rights action."s
Since the availability and amount of retrospective compensation for due process violations (through section 1983 civil
rights actions) and regulatory takings may vary significantly,'8 5
their remedial similarity does not obviate the need to clearly
identify their respective applicability. However, it is important
to recognize that although the remedies may differ, they are
not incompatible. An adjudication that a regulation was both a
taking and a violation of substantive due process would not
have contradictory consequences. Prospectively, the effect
would be the same."' Retrospectively, the recovery of compensation for the taking would simply preempt a section 1983
180. This proposition assumes that the police power measure, whether or not it
satisfied the substantive due process legitimate public purpose limitation on police
power measures, would satisfy the public use prerequisite for exercise of the power of
eminent domain. The United States Supreme Court recently has virtually equated the
police power "public purpose" and eminent domain "public use" requirements and has
rendered both limitations of little consequence. Hawaii Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff, 467
U.S. 229, 240-41 (1984) ("The 'public use' requirement is thus coterminous with the
[W]here the exercise of the eminent domain
scope of a sovereign's police powers ....
power is rationally related to a conceivable public purpose, the Court has never held a
compensated taking to be proscribed by the Public Use Clause.")
However, the Washington State Constitution imposes a more restrictive "public
use" limitation on the exercise of eminent domain. See, e.g., In re Petition of City of
Seattle, 96 Wash. 2d 616, 638 P.2d 549 (1981).
181. See, e.g., In re Petition of City of Seattle, 96 Wash. 2d 616, 638 P.2d 549.
182. See Orion II, 109 Wash. 2d 621, 649, 747 P.2d 1062, 1077.
183. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1982).
184. See San Diego Gas & Elec. Co. v. City of San Diego, 450 U.S. 621, 656 n.23
(1981) (Brennan, J., dissenting); Williamson County Regional Planning Comm'n v.
Hamilton Bank, 473 U.S. 172, 192-94 (1985).
185. See generally, H. Monaghan, State Law Wrong State Law Remedies, and the
Fourteenth Amendment, 86 COLUM. L. REv. 979 (1986); Bley, Use of the Civil Rights
Acts to Recover Money Damagesfor the Overregulationof Land, 14 URB. L. 223 (1982).
186. See supra text accompanying notes 176-80.
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cause of action. 8 7
All police power regulation is subject to the substantive
due process limitation and to the remedy of invalidation for
violation. But the remedy of retrospective compensation is
directly available only for regulatory takings and not for substantive due process violations. Since the Orion claimants
sought compensation rather than invalidation, the court properly deemed it necessary to determine whether all, or only
some, police power regulation was subject to the taking limitation, and, if only some, whether the challenged regulations
were included.'"
In its statement of what it considered to be ideal doctrine,
the court preliminarily concluded that the taking limitation
should apply only to police power regulation going "beyond
preventing harm to actually enhance a publicly owned right in
land."'8 9 The court justified its conclusion on the basis of both
Washington case law' 9° and the policy concern that the public
interest in environmental quality would suffer excessively if
potential liability for inverse condemnation damages loomed
over every regulatory act.' 9 ' Then, after considering the consistency of this rule with preemptive United States Supreme
Court decisions, the court made appropriate revisions. 192 The
revised rule insulated regulations from the taking limitation if
they substantially advanced legitimate public interests in
health, safety, environment, or fiscal integrity of the
community.

19 3

The court's goal of clarifying when regulation may be subject to the remedy of inverse condemnation damages is commendable.9' However, the rule and reasoning adopted in
187. See Hamilton Bank, 473 U.S. at 194-95 (1985); Allingham v. City of Seattle,
109 Wash. 2d 947, 954, 749 P.2d 160, 164 (1988).
188. Orion II, 109 Wash. 2d at 649, 659-61, 747 P.2d at 1077, 1082-83.
189. Id. at 651, 747 P.2d at 1078.
190. See supra note 149.
191. Orion II, 109 Wash. 2d at 651-52, 747 P.2d at 1078.
192. Id. at 652-57, 747 P.2d at 1079-82.
193. Id. at 657, 747 P.2d at 1081.
194. As Justice Stevens suggested in his dissent in First English Evangelical
Lutheran Church v. Los Angeles County, 107 S. Ct. 2378 (1987), clarification is sorely
needed in this area:
It is no answer to say that "[a]fter all, if a policeman must know the
Constitution, then why not a planner?" San Diego Gas & Electric Co. v. San
Diego, 450 U.S. 621, 661, n.26, 101 S. Ct. 1287, 1309, n. 26, 67 L.Ed.2d 551 (1981)
(Brennan, J., dissenting). To begin with, the Court has repeatedly recognized
that it itself cannot establish any objective rules to assess when a regulation
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Orion fall short of attaining this goal. The court expressed a
strong preference for its ideal rule because it clearly signalled
to land use regulators the point at which compensation would
be required.' 95 But neither the ideal nor the revised rule are
sufficiently clear to provide significant guidance to government
officials.
The ideal rule is stated in several different ways but never
explained or illustrated. It would preclude the possibility of a
taking and the inverse condemnation remedy for regulations
with the purpose and effect of preventing public harm' or
safeguarding the public." The taking limitation would pertain
only to regulations that, in various versions, "accomplish a de
facto exercise of the eminent domain power,"' 98 "actually
enhance a publicly owned right in land,"'" or "provide the
public with some use of the land." 2° 0 Under this rule, regulatory measures to control nuisances clearly would not be subject
to the taking limitation, while a regulation requiring a landbecomes a taking. See Hodel v. Irving, 481 U.S. [704], -, 107 S. Ct. 2076, -, 95
L.Ed.2d - (1987); Andrus v. Allard, 444 U.S. 51, 65, 100 S. Ct. 318, 326, 62
L.Ed.2d 210 (1979); Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 123-124, 98 S. Ct. at 2658-2659.
How then can it demand that land planners do any better? However
confusing some of our criminal procedure cases may be, I do not believe they
have been as open-ended and standardless as our regulatory takings cases are.
As one commentator concluded: 'The chaotic state of taking law makes it
especially likely that availability of the damages remedy will induce land-use
planning officials to stay well back of the invisible line that they dare not
cross." Johnson, Compensation for Invalid Land-Use Regulations, 15 GA. L.
REv. 559, 594 (1981); see also Sallet, The Problem of Municipal Liability for
Zoning and Land-Use Regulation, 31 CATH. U. L. REv. 465, 478 (1982); Charles
v. Diamond, 41 N.Y.2d 318, 331-332, 392 N.Y.S.2d 594, 604, 360 N.E.2d 1295,
1305 (1977); Allen v. City and County of Honolulu, 58 Haw. 432, 439, 571 P.2d
328, 331 (1977).
Another critical distinction between police activity and land-use planning
is that not every missed call by a policeman gives rise to civil liability; police
officers enjoy individual immunity for actions taken in good faith. See Harlow
v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 102 S. Ct. 2727, 73 L.Ed.2d 396 (1982); Davis v.
Scherer, 468 U.S. 183, 104 S. Ct. 3012, 82 L.Ed.2d 139 (1984). Moreover,
municipalities are not subject to civil liability for police officers' routine
judgment errors. See Monell v. New York City Dept of Social Services, 436
U.S. 658, 98 S. Ct. 2018, 56 L.Ed.2d 611 (1978). In the land regulation context,
however, I am afraid that any decision by a competent regulatory body may
establish a "policy or custom" and give rise to liability after today.
First English, 107 S.Ct. at 2399 n.17 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
195. Orion II, 109 Wash. 2d at 651-52, 747 P.2d at 107.
196. Id. at 651, 747 P.2d at 1078.
197. Id.
198. Id.
199. Id.
200. Id. at 653, 747 P.2d at 1079.
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owner to establish a public park clearly would. But the ideal
rule would have no significant predictive value in major areas
of land use regulation-historic district, landmark, billboard,
landscaping, and architectural controls, to name a few. The
harm prevention/benefit conferral distinction generally has
been proposed as a test for the validity of regulation (without
distinguishing between the due process and taking limitations)
rather than for the potential availability of damages. °1 While
in that context, the test has had some abstract appeal, °2 scholarly support,20 3 and judicial recognition. 2°4 It frequently has
been criticized as unworkable because the purpose and effect
of virtually any regulation can be characterized in terms of
either public harm prevention or public benefit conferral. °5
However, it is not even clear that this is the distinction the
ideal rule employs. Given the qualifying phrases the court
used-"to actually enhance a publicly owned right in land""°
and "[to] provide the public with some use of the land" 2 07-the
applicability of the taking limitation may be narrower than
under the harm prevention/benefit conferral test.20 8 The court
201. The theory first was propounded by Professor Freund. See E. FREUND, THE
POLICE POWER: PUBLIC POLICY AND CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS 546-47 (1904)
[hereinafter FREUND]. It was further developed by Professor Dunham in a classic
article, A. Dunham, A Legal and Economic Basisfor City Planning,58 COLUM. L. REv.
650 (1958) [hereinafter Dunham]. Under this theory, police power measures regulating
land use were constitutionally permissible exercises only if their purpose and effect
was to prevent harm rather than to confer a public benefit. See MANDELKER, LAND
USE LAW 18-21 (1982) [hereinafter MANDELKER].
202. See supra note 201.
203. See FREUND, supra note 201, at 546-47; see also Sax, Takings, PrivateProperty
and Public Rights, 81 YALE L.J. 149 (1971).
204. See Penn Central Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 133 n.30 (1978);
Maple Leaf Investors, Inc. v. Department of Ecology, 88 Wash. 2d 726, 733-34, 565 P.2d
1162, 1165 (1977).
205. Which of the following are the purposes of regulations restricting billboards:
controlling architectural design; preserving historical landmarks and districts,
wetlands, open space, and wildlife habitat? Are these purposes preventing harm or
conferring benefits? See MANDELKER, supra note 201, at 18-20; SETTLE, supra note 27,
at 231-32. In Penn Central, historic landmark preservation was characterized as harm
prevention and benefit conferral, respectively, by the majority and dissenting opinions.
Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 138, 146. In Westwood Forest Estates, Inc. v. Village of South
Nyark, 23 N.Y.2d 424, 427, 244 N.E.2d 700, 702, 297 N.Y.S.2d 129, 132 (1969), regulation
based on inadequate sewage treatment capacity was invalidated as benefit conferring,
while in Smoke Rise, Inc. v. Washington Suburban Sanitary Comm'n, 400 F. Supp.
1369, 1382 (D.Md. 1975), a sewer hookup moratorium was characterized as preventing
harm and was upheld.
206. Orion II, 109 Wash. at 651, 747 P.2d at 1078 (1987).
207. Id. at 653, 747 P.2d at 1079.
208. Such language suggests that the court may, without saying, be basing its ideal
rule on the distinction between government regulation that burdens private property
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may have meant that the taking limitation applies only to regulations designed to benefit adjacent public land.
To satisfy perceived minimum federal standards, the court
adopted a revised rule that precluded the applicability of the
taking clause and its inverse condemnation remedy to regulations that substantially serve important public interestshealth, safety, environment, and fiscal integrity of the community.2" The revised rule seems to extend the taking limitation's applicability further than the ideal rule would. By its
terms, some public harm prevention measures that do not
serve the subsets of health, safety, environmental quality, or
fiscal integrity interests would be subject to the taking limitation. 21 0 And such regulation apparently would be subject to
if1 it did not "actually enhance a pubthe taking limitation even 21
licly owned right in land."
The precise meaning of the revised rule is less clear than
the ideal rule, as the court lamented 21 2 but declined to ameliorate by explanation or illustration. It is difficult to imagine a
regulation that does not arguably serve the public interest in
health, safety, environment, or fiscal integrity of the community. Unfortunately, the court's application of the rule to State
and local SMA regulations and the State sanctuary designation
did not illuminate the meaning of the rule except as to the
facts at hand. Without explanatory reasoning, the SMA regulations were summarily characterized as health and safety measto enhance a public enterprise, on the one hand, or resolution of competing private
claims for resources, on the other. It has been proposed that government, through the
police power, may constitutionally reduce private property value in its capacity as
arbiter of competing private interests but not in its capacity as proprietor of public
enterprises. See Sax, Takings and the Police Power, 74 YALE L.J. 36 (1964). This
theoretical distinction, like the harm prevention/benefit conferral test, has been
proposed as a determinant of the validity of police power measures, not entitlement to

inverse condemnation damages. Id. The two proposed tests share a common
disability-they provide no basis for predictable application of their categories. See
Maple Leaf Investors, Inc. v. Department of Ecology, 88 Wash. 2d 726, 733-34, 565 P.2d
1162, 1165 (1977).
209. Orion II, 109 Wash. 2d at 653-57, 747 P.2d at 1079-81.
210. The court's emphasis upon several specific police power purposes that were

insulated from the taking limitation necessarily implied that other police power
purposes were not. Thus, police measures designed to protect such "other" legitimate
public interests from harm apparently would be subject to the taking limitation under
the revised rule but not under the ideal rule. Orion II, 109 Wash. 2d at 653-57, 747 P.2d
at 1079-81.
211. Id.
212. Id. at 657, 747 P.2d at 1081 ("Even under the Supreme Court's approach,
however, land-use decisionmakers have a guidepost, albeit a vague one, by which to
gauge their actions.")
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ures immune from the taking limitation,2 1 3 while the sanctuary
designation-because its purpose was not "to safeguard the
public health or safety, but rather to protect the preexisting
uses in the area"-was subject to the taking clause.21 4
The most serious difficulty with the revised rule is its
inconsistency with the very minimum standards of federal regulatory taking law it was revised to meet. This is true not only
of the revised rule itself, but also of the premise underlying
both the ideal rule and the revised rule-that some police
power regulation, probably most police power regulation, is not
even subject to the taking limitation. The purpose of this
premise certainly is defensible as a matter of policy. Indeed,
for many years, commentators have persuasively argued, 215 and
some courts have decided,2 16 that Justice Holmes' use of the
word "taking" in Pennsylvania Coal was but a metaphor for
deprivation of property without due process, that the taking
clause was never intended to and does not apply to police
power regulation, and that the the inverse condemnation remedy of compensation is never applicable to regulatory measures. 217 Regardless of its merits, this line of argument was
explicitly rejected recently by the United States Supreme
Court in First English Evangelical Lutheran Church v. Los
Angeles County.2 18 The Court clearly held that police power
regulation is subject to the taking clause and its remedy of
inverse condemnation damages.2 1 9 Moreover, the holding was
not limited to regulation that does not substantially serve public interests in health, safety, environment, and the fiscal integrity of the community.2 2 The Washington Supreme Court
understandably was misled by a passage in FirstEnglish:
We accordingly have no occasion to decide whether the
ordinance at issue actually denied appellant all use of its
property or whether the county might avoid the conclusion
213. Id. at 660-61, 747 P.2d at 1083. Of course, the state and local SMA regulations
would have remained subject to the substantive due process limitation and invalidation
remedy if it had been sought. See supra text accompanying note 166.
214. Orion II, 109 Wash. 2d at 662, 747 P.2d at 1084.
215. E.g., BossELmAN, CALLiEs & BANTA, supra note 28.
216. E.g., Agins v. City of Tiburon, 24 Cal.2d 266, 598 P.2d 25, 157 Cal. Rptr. 372
(1979); Fred F. French Investing Co. v. New York City, 39 N.Y.2d 587, 350 N.E.2d 381,
385 N.Y.S.2d 5 (1976).
217. See supra note 216. See also Orion II, 109 Wash. 2d at 651, 747 P.2d at 1078.
218. 107 S. Ct. 2378 (1987).
219. Id. at 2386-87.
220. Id. at 2389.
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that a compensable taking had occurred by establishing that
the denial of all use was insulated 2as21 a part of the State's
authority to enact safety regulations.
On the basis of the word "insulated," which does not
appear in this context in any other relevant Supreme Court
opinion, the Washington Supreme Court concluded that police
power measures serving certain important public interests are
insulated from, that is, are categorically exempt from, the taking limitation and its compensation requirement.2 2 2 This is a
plausible interpretation of the Supreme Court's literal language.22 3 However, in light of the history of the debate arising
out of the never resolved Mugler-PennsylvaniaCoal conflict,2 2 4
it is highly unlikely that the Court would decide the issue in a
single, offhand phrase. The history of Supreme Court regulatory taking case law suggests a much more credible interpretation of the ambiguous FirstEnglish language. The question of
whether the ordinance effected a regulatory taking was clearly
not before the Court. That issue was to be decided by the state
court upon remand. In deciding that issue, the state court,
applying the relevant factors prior case law has established,
may decide that the ordinance is not a taking even if it denies
all beneficial use because of the important public interests it
25

serves.2

The Washington Supreme Court also relied on Keystone
Bituminous Coal Association v. DeBenedictis for its conclusion
that some police power measures are categorically excluded
221. Id. at 2384-85.
222. Orion II, 109 Wash. 2d at 654 n.23, 747 P.2d at 1080 n.23.
223. The word "insulated" is not a term of art in regulatory taking law. Given the
word's plain meaning, "to set apart, detach... separate," WEBSTER'S NEW TWENTIETH
CENTURY DIcrIONARY 952 (2d ed. 1983), the United States Supreme Court may have
meant regulations were not subject to the taking limitation at all. However, the Court
said such insulation would avoid not the applicability of the taking clause, itself, but
the "conclusion that a compensable taking had occurred." FirstEnglish, 107 S. Ct. at
2384-85. Such language indicates that the preferred purpose of the regulation would be
weighed along with other relevant considerations to reach a conclusion.
224. See supra text accompanying notes 34-95.
225. See supra note 223. If the Court meant that any category of regulation was
exempt from the taking limitation, that category probably was limited to regulations
restricting uses equivalent to common law nuisances. See, e.g., Keystone Bituminous
Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470, 491 n.20 (1987). But in Keystone, which had
been decided less than three months prior to First English, the Court did not even
characterize regulations extinguishing public nuisances as categorically exempt from
the taking limitation. Rather, the Court said that such an important public purpose
weighed heavily in the regulatory taking calculus. Id. at 491-92.
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from taking clause accountability.2 26 But if Keystone had
adopted this premise, the Supreme Court's regulatory taking
analysis would have ended once the Court concluded that the
statute served important public interests in health, safety, and
fiscal integrity of the area.2 ' Rather, the Court considered
the relative importance of the public interests served as one of
the critical factors in determining whether a taking had
occurred. 2 8
If these and other Supreme Court cases recognized any
regulations to be categorically immune from the taking limitation, it would be those regulatory measures abating common
law nuisances or their equivalent.2 9 It is often said that there
is no property right to maintain a nuisance and, hence, regulatory abatement cannot be a taking of property.2 30 But in Keystone, the Court nevertheless stopped short of even this limited
categorical insulation from the taking limitation.231' The federal taking cases certainly indicate that the nature and extent
of the public interests served by regulatory measures are often
regarded as important determinants of whether a regulatory
taking occurred. But these cases do not support the Orion conclusion that major categories of police power regulation are
categorically immune from the taking limitation.2 32 However,
this Orion rule may endure, whether consistent with minimum
federal constitutional standards or not, given the infrequency
of United States Supreme Court review.23 3
226. Orion II, 109 Wash. 2d at 654, 747 P.2d at 1080. See supra note 225.
227. Keystone, 480 U.S. at 485-88.
228. Id.
229. Id. at 491 n.20.
230. Id.
231. As the Supreme Court noted in Keystone:
The Court's hesitance to find a taking when the State merely restrains
uses of property that are tantamount to public nuisances is consistent with the
notion of "reciprocity of advantage" ....
• . . As the cases discussed above demonstrate, the public interest in
preventing activities similar to public nuisances is a substantial one.
Keystone, 480 U.S. at 491-92 (citation omitted) (quoting Pennsylvania Coal Co. v.
Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 (1922).
232. See supra text accompanying notes 209-29.

233. The rarity of Supreme Court review of state regulatory taking decisions
effectively delegates to the state courts extensive leeway in constructing the federal
taking limitation. The Supreme Court denied certiorari in Orion II 108 S. Ct. 1996
(1988).
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Standardsfor Regulatory Takings

In Orion, the court devoted far more attention to the
threshold issue of taking clause applicability 234 than to standards for regulatory takings. Orion does not explicitly discredit or question the regulatory taking standards of prior
Washington or federal cases. Once the court had determined
that the State sanctuary designation was potentially subject to
the taking limitation, the court proceeded hypothetically to
apply regulatory taking doctrine to the State's action.
Whether the sanctuary designation effected a regulatory tak234. See supra text accompanying notes 170-233.
235. The preclusion of dredging, filling, diking, and farming by the public trust
doctrine was not subject to the taking limitation because these restrictions were a
consequence of the State's power to define private property rights. Orion II, 109 Wash.
2d at 641, 659-60, 747 P.2d at 1073, 1082-83. Since Orion and its predecessors in
ownership had no private property right to make uses of the tidelands that would
interfere with public rights to navigate and recreate in overflowing waters, the public
trust doctrine restrictions could not effect a taking of private property. Id. See also
supra note 146.
If State and local regulation under the SMA, prior to the State sanctuary
legislation, had precluded uses that were permissible under the public trust doctrine
(i.e., practically feasible and reasonably profitable) such regulation could not be a
taking because it was insulated from the taking limitation by virtue of its public health
and environmental protection purposes. See Orion II, 109 Wash. 2d at 657, 659-62, 747
P.2d at 1082-84. So limitations on use effected by the SMA and SCSMMP alone
(independent of the State sanctuary legislation) were subject only to the substantive
due process limitation and its invalidation remedy which Orion had not sought. Id. at
654-55, 747 P.2d 1078-80.
The court held that only the State sanctuary legislation potentially effected a
regulatory taking. Id. at 663, 747 P.2d at 1085. The court had determined that the
SMA and SCSMMP alone would not have precluded aquaculture, which was allowable
as a conditional use if compatible with adjacent shoreline uses; that before the
sanctuary legislation, aquaculture would have been compatible with such uses; but that
after the sanctuary legislation, aquaculture on Orion's private tidelands would be
incompatible with sanctuary uses of adjacent tidelands acquired by the State. See id. at
631-33, 747 P.2d at 1068-69. This was an astonishing conclusion as a matter of summary
judgment since the Director of Ecology stated in affidavits that aquaculture on private
tidelands adjacent to publicly owned sanctuary tidelands would be compatible with
sanctuary purposes. Id. So although the sanctuary legislation itself did not regulate
tideland use at all, it authorized public acquisition of tidelands for a sanctuary whose
purpose might be a proximate cause of denial of a SMA conditional use permit for
aquaculture on Orion's adjacent tidelands. Id. at 659-62, 747 P.2d at 1082-84. It was this
indirect regulatory effect of the sanctuary legislation that was potentially a regulatory
taking, but only if aquaculture (or some other unknown use which would have been
permissible but for the sanctuary legislation) was practically feasible and reasonably
profitable, to be determined on remand. Id. at 662, 747 P.2d at 1084. Ironically, Orion
had been arguing throughout the litigation in support of its taking claim that even if
aquaculture were permissible, there nevertheless would be a taking because of
practical infeasibility and economic insufficiency of such a use. Now, under the court's
reasoning, Orion must return to the trial court and successfully argue that aquaculture
would have been feasible and reasonably rewarding so that its preclusion was a taking.
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ing depended upon two inquiries:2 " first, did the regulation
substantially advance a legitimate public interest; and second,
did the regulation impose excessive economic burden upon the
property owner?23? The two standards stated were in the
vague mainstream of state and federal regulatory taking case
law, 238 but did not advance the cause of more coherent doctrine
without significant elaboration.
1.

Substantial advancement of public interest

The first standard--did the regulation substantially
advance a legitimate public interest-presented fewer difficulties than the second, although understanding would have been
fostered by exploration of its nature and purpose. Since the
court's reason for distinguishing regulatory takings from mere
substantive due process violations was the availability of the
compensation remedy, 2 s the substantial public interest
advancement standard must have been derived from the public
use requirement of the taking clause. 240 That this standard
may differ from its substantive due process counterpart was
acknowledged but not resolved. 24 ' However, this requirement,
whether characterized in due process terms of "reasonable" or
"substantial" advancement of a public interest or in eminent
domain terms of public use, generally has been permissively
and quite predictably applied. 2 1 In Orion, the court summaOf course, the court's decision has so reduced the stake that a return to the trial court
seems extremely unlikely.
236. Variously stated in Orion II, 109 Wash. 2d at 655, 658, 663, 747 P.2d at 1080,
1082, 1084.
237. Id. Note that the court's first articulation of the standard is that the private
economic burden must "outweigh" the public interest served. Id. at 655, 747 P.2d at
1080. Subsequent statements of the standard refer only to the extent of the private
economic burden.
238. See, e.g., Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBendectis, 480 U.S. 470 (1987);
Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 260 (1980); Penn Central Transp. Co. v. New
York City, 438 U.S. 104, 123-138 (1978).
239. Orion II, 109 Wash. 2d at 649, 749 P.2d at 1077.
240. Once the court had clearly distinguished between the substantive due process
and taking limitations and recognized that some police power measures are subject to
the taking limitation, both the just compensation and public use requirements of the
taking clause became applicable.
241. Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 107 S. Ct. 3141, 3147 n.31 (1987); Orion
II, 109 Wash. 2d at 654, 747 P.2d at 1079-80.
242. See supra note 179 and accompanying text. See Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co.,
467 U.S. 986, 1014-1015 (1984) (the scope of the public use requirement of taking clause
is coterminous with proper public power purpose, and role of reviewing courts is
extremely narrow); Hawaii Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229 (1984); Rosenthal &
Rosenthal, Inc. v. New York State Urban Dev. Corp., 605 F. Supp. 612 (S.D.N.Y. 1985);
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rily concluded that the sanctuary designation did substantially
advance legitimate public interests in ecosystem research and
education and in nonintensive recreation. 3
2.

Excessive economic burden

The task of the second standard is far more difficultdetermining whether an individual property owner or the public at large should shoulder the economic burden of serving the
public interest. 2 " It is hardly surprising that definitive principles drawing the line between permissible and impermissible
Callies, supra note 1 at 611-613; but see In re Petition of City of Seattle, 96 Wash. 2d
616, 627, 638 P.2d 549, 556 (1981) ("The fact that the public interest may require [a
condemnation] is insufficient if the use is not really public.")
243. Orion II, 109 Wash. 2d at 662-64, 747 P.2d at 1084-85. The court's discussion of
this standard in terms of a required "nexus" between the challenged regulatory
requirements and the public purpose they serve, id. at 663-66, 747 P.2d at 1084-86, is
not required by Nollan. While Nollan employs unnecessarily broad language, the
"nexus" requirement is applicable only to regulatory exactions-regulations that
require a landowner to concede a fundamental attribute of property ownership as a
prerequisite to obtaining government approval of a development proposal. Such
regulation is effectively subject to much stricter regulatory taking standards than
regulation that merely restricts use. See supra text accompanying notes 31-69, and
infra notes 221-56. Nollan, 107 S. Ct. at 3145-48. Such regulation is a taking unless the
regulatory appropriation of a property right is reasonably designed to protect a
legitimate public purpose by offsetting or preventing adverse impacts of the proposed
development on the public interest. To avoid a taking, it is not enough that the
regulatory exaction of property fosters some legitimate public interest. Rather, the
regulatory exaction must reasonably (that is, quite specifically and proportionately)
counter adverse public impact of the proposed development. Nollan, 107 S. Ct. at 3148.
Thus, in Nollan, the regulatory exaction of a public easement along a privately owned
portion of the beach in front of the proposed house was held to be a taking. Id. at 3150.
It was a taking not because the exaction failed to advance a public interest, but because
it was unfair to appropriate a private property interest from the Nollans to repair
harm to a public interest that the Nollans had not adversely affected. Id. at 3147-48.
The Court hypothetically acknowledged that it would have been proper to have
exacted a public easement to a viewpoint in front of the house to compensate for the
view-blocking impact of the proposed house. Id. at 3147. See, e.g., Unlimited v. Kitsap
County, 50 Wash. App. 723, 750 P.2d 651 (1988), where Division of the Washington
Court of Appeals noted that "[police] power is properly exercised . . . where the
problem to be remedied by the exaction arises from the development under
construction .. " Id. at 727, 750 P.2d at 653.
Since Orion II did not involve a regulatory exaction of a property right, but
merely a limitation of use, the Nollan nexus requirement was irrelevant. Although
citing Nollan and using the term "nexus," the court seemed to require only that the
challenged regulation plausibly foster a legitimate public interest, as was proper. See
Orion II, 109 Wash. 2d at 654, 747 P.2d at 1080. See also Keystone Bituminous Coal
Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 107 S. Ct. 1232, 1245-46 (1987); Penn Central Transp. Co. v. New
York City, 438 U.S. 104, 129-30 (1978); Callies, Taking Clause-Take Three, A.B.A J., at
48-53 November 1, 1987.
244. See, e.g., Keystone, 480 U.S. at 491-93; Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 125; Orion II,
109 Wash. 2d at 648, 747 P.2d at 1076-77.
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regulatory redistributions of wealth have been elusive. Routinely conceding that there is no "precise formula" or "single,
simple test" and, hence, each case must be decided on its own
facts, the courts are in general agreement on the pertinence of
"several factors. ' 24 1 These considerations are variously and
quite indiscriminately said to include the following: the "character of the governmental action,"2' that is, the purpose and
effect of the police power measure; the "economic impact of
the regulation on the claimant;2' 4 the diminution in private
property value;' the extent to which such depreciation disappointed "distinct investment-backed expectations;" 249 the
extent to which the regulatory burdens were offset by reciprocal benefits; 2- ° balancing of private loss and public gain;25 ' and
whether any reasonably beneficial use remains. 252 These considerations are virtually never explained, and their interrelationships are generally ignored even though some seem to be
mutually exclusive and some seem to be components or determinants of others.A
245. See, e.g., Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255 at 260-61; Penn Central, 438
U.S. at 125; Maple Leaf Investors, Inc. v. Department of Ecology, 88 Wash. 2d 726, 73134, 565 P.2d 1162, 1164-66 (1977).
246. See Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 124.
247. Id.
248. Keystone, 480 U.S. at 497; Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 413
(1922); Agins, 447 U.S. at 261; Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 124.
249. See supra note 248.
250. See supra note 248; Department of Ecology v. Pacesetter Constr. Co., 89
Wash. 2d 203, 211, 571 P.2d 196, 200 (1977).
251. See supra note 248; Department of Natural Resources v. Thurston County, 92
Wash. 2d 656, 668, 601 P.2d 494, 500 (1979); Pacesetter Constr., 89 Wash. 2d at 207-211,
571 P.2d at 198-200; Maple LeafInvestors Inc. 88 Wash. 2d 726, 731, 565 P.2d 1162, 1164

(1977).
252. Keystone, 480 U.S. at 495-97; Agins, 447 U.S. at 260; Penn Central, 438 U.S. at
136-38; Buttnick v. City of Seattle, 105 Wash. 2d 857, 862, 719 P.2d 93, 96 (1986); DNR v.
Thurston County, 92 Wash. 2d at 669, 601 P.2d at 500-501.
253. Once the character of the government action is determined, the applicability
of the remaining considerations differs. For example, a regulation that effectively
appropriates or deprives the property owner of a fundamental attribute of ownership
generally is a taking regardless of the other factors. See Keystone, 480 U.S. at 488-89
n.18. On the other hand, a regulation that merely regulates the use of property is
generally analyzed on the basis of some or all of the remaining considerations. In such
cases, "economic impact" may mean how much value was lost or how much was
retained (diminution in value or reasonably beneficial use?). To the extent that value
lost is deemed relevant, its importance may depend upon whether the lost value was
distinctly supported by reasonable investment-backed expectations and whether the
lost value was offset by benefits conferred upon the landowner by the challenged
regulation. When courts attempt to determine whether the private loss of property
value is outweighed by public gain ("balancing"), courts often recognize that some
public purposes are more important than others. CompareKeystone, 480 U.S. at 485-93

University of Puget Sound Law Review

382

[Vol. 12:339

This doctrinal uncertainty about when police regulation
goes "too far"254 has not been reduced by Orion. The court
stated without qualification that whether a regulation's economic impact is excessive is determined by comparing private
loss and public gain. 2 1 Under this so-called "balancing test," if
the former outweighs the latter, there is a taking.25 But having said this, the court made no further mention of balancing
and, in fact, never purported to compare the public gain and
private loss of the sanctuary designation.
3.

Economic impact tests for "facial" and "as applied"
challenges

The court did explain that the test for constitutionally
excessive economic impact differed for "facial" and "as
applied" regulatory taking claims. 257

Since Orion challenged

the estuary designation as applied, the court said the "significance of the economic deprivation" would depend on (1) "the
challenged regulation's economic impact," and (2) the "extent
of its interference with reasonable, investment-backed expectations. ' '2 '

A more demanding test would apply to facial chal-

lenges-whether the mere enactment of the regulation
precluded all economically viable use of the property.
a.

Measuring Economic Impact

To say that economic impact will be considered offers no
guidance absent a qualitative and quantitative explanation of
the standards by which economic impacts would constitute takings. The court, without elaboration, acknowledged the qualitative norm that economic impact might be excessive because a
fundamental attribute of ownership had been extinguished,2 9
regardless of quantitative economic impact. Since Orion's
rights to possess, exclude others from, and transfer ownership
in its tidelands were unaffected by the challenged regulations,
(state act requiring coal columns be left to support the surface served a substantial
public interest) with Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 124-31 (law to preserve historic
landmarks did not prevent owner from realizing a reasonable return).
254. Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 413, 415 (1922).
255. See Orion II, 109 Wash. 2d at 655, 747 P.2d at 1080.
256. See Department of Ecology v. Pacesetter Constr. Co., 89 Wash. 2d at 209-10,
571 P.2d at 199-200 (1977).
257. Orion II, 109 Wash. 2d at 655-56, 747 P.2d at 1081. See also Keystone, 480 U.S.
at 494-95.
258. Orion II, 109 Wash. 2d at 656, 747 P.2d at 1081.
259. Id. at 664, 747 P.2d at 1085.
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there was no taking on the basis of this qualitative standard.2 °
Absent regulatory deprivation of a fundamental attribute
of property ownership, excessive economic impact was to be
determined by a quantitative standard-whether the claimant's
property retained reasonable market value. 26' The court
stressed that reasonable market value did not mean reasonable
use as that term has been understood. Even if the challenged
regulation precluded a reasonable use by Orion, it would not
be a taking if another private person or corporation would sufficiently value passive ownership of the tidelands to pay a price
equivalent to their reasonable use value.2 62 Since Orion had
not been deprived of a fundamental attribute of property ownership but may have been deprived of all reasonably valuable
use, the legal excessiveness of economic impact might ultimately depend on whether the tidelands retained a "reasonable fair market value" because it could possibly be sold to a
nongovernmental buyer (e.g., The Nature Conservancy), to be
determined on remand. 63
b.

Interference With Investment-Backed Expectations

The extent of interference with reasonable investmentbacked expectations was the court's second consideration 2 64 in
determining the significance of the economic deprivation. This
variable, while often mentioned, never has been adequately
explained.26 5 Orion, without any explicit elaboration, offered
some guidance by implication. The court held that Orion had
no reasonable investment-backed investment worthy of consideration because its investment was induced by expectations
that it could dredge and fill the tidelands which the public
trust doctrine precluded. 26 The court does not say, but one
can plausibly infer, that Orion's investment-backed expectations were deemed either unreasonable or legally irrelevant
since Orion's private property rights were limited by the public
trust when the investments were made.2 67
260. Id. at 665, 747 P.2d at 1085.

261. Id.
262. Id.
263. Id.
264. Id. at 664, 747 P.2d at 1085.
265. See Mandelker, Investment-backed Expectations: Is There a Taking?, 31
WASH. U.J. URB. & CoNTEmP. L. 3 (1987).
266. Orion II, 109 Wash. 2d at 656-66, 747 P.2d at 1086.
267. Orion I,

109 Wash. 2d at 665-66, 747 P.2d at 1085-86. See Rose-Ackerman,

supra note 3, at 1700 n.1, 1702-05.
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Balancing test

Whether the balancing test for excessive economic impact
was retained, abandoned, or qualified by Orion or, perhaps, relegated to substantive due process service is anybody's guess.
The balancing test is generally traced to Pennsylvania Coal in
which Justice Holmes, in characterizing the challenged statute's modest contribution to the public interest as inadequate
to justify the private burden imposed, suggested that more
socially beneficial regulation would have justified greater diminution of property value. Most subsequent state and federal
decisions 2 " have acknowledged the general relevance of the
balancing test without explaining what it actually means, how
it would operate, how it relates to other relevant considerations, and whether it is conclusive. Obviously, the test does not
pertain to the power of eminent domain.2 6 9 If compensation
for government expropriation of property for public projects
were required only when private loss outweighed public gain,
dispossessed landowners would seldom receive payment. Such
balancing measures efficiency rather than redistribution of
Since the taking limitation is designed to preclude
wealth.
unfair wealth redistribution" 7 rather than inefficiency, it has
been persuasively argued that the balancing test is irrelevant
to the taking issue and should be considered only as a standard
of substantive due process. 7 2 This argument was explicitly
268. See supra note 251.
269. See Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419 (1982); 2 J.
SACKmAN, NICHoLS' THE LAW OF EMINENT DOMAIN § 6.01 (3d ed. 1985).
270. As long as a regulation produces aggregate benefits that exceed aggregate
costs, that is, as long as it efficiently allocates resources according to the Kaldor-Hicks
test, see Fischel, Introduction: UtilitarianBalancing and Formalism in Takings, 88
Colum. L. Rev. 1581, 1584 (1988), the balancing test is satisfied regardless of extreme
wealth redistribution consequences.
271. The fundamental mission of the regulatory taking limitation is virtually
always stated in terms of wealth redistribution rather than efficiency. See, e.g., Orion
II,109 Wash. 2d at 648, 747 P.2d at 1077. ("Basically, the primary problem caused by an
excessive police power regulation is that it requires the landowner to shoulder an
economic burden, which in justice and fairness the public should rightfully bear.");
Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 260 (1980) ("The determination that
governmental action constitutes a taking is, in essence, a determination that the public
at large, rather than a single owner, must bear the burden of an exercise of state
power in the public interest."); Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 49 (1960).
("The Fifth Amendment's guarantee... [is] designed to bar Government from forcing
some people alone to bear public burdens which, in all fairness and justice, should be
borne by the public as a whole.") See Kmiec, supra note 47, at 1638-44.
272. The balancing test is simply irrelevant to a constitutional limitation on
regulatory redistribution of wealth. See, e.g., D. MANDELKER, LAND USE LAw 20-21
(1982).
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rejected by the Washington Court in Department of Ecology v.
Pacesetter Construction Co."73 In an ambiguous footnote, 74
Orion may have meant to say that the balancing test really
pertains only to substantive due process and not to the taking
limitation. The rest of the opinion offers no guidance regarding whether balancing has been banished from the realm of
the taking limitation and its compensation remedy. On the one
hand, the court clearly incorporates balancing into its first
enunciation of regulatory taking standards." 5 On the other
hand, having done so, the court does not incorporate balancing
into its subsequent statements of standards, and never considers the balance of private harm and public gain in its application of the standards."7
5.

Value diminution tests-value remaining and value lost

Aside from ambiguous language concerning the relevance
of the balancing test, the Orion quantitative standard for constitutionally excessive economic impact, 2 7 as applied by the
court, 27 8 seems exclusively concerned with diminution of prop-

erty value. The standard has two parts that focus respectively
on the two aspects of property value depreciation; the amount
of value lost and the amount of value retained. The first part
of the standard addresses the extent of value retained. While
this standard is not new, Orion provides helpful explanation
that even if no reasonable use (in the traditional sense of an
active use) 279 remains, there is no taking if the property has a
reasonable market value for passive conservation use. The second part of the standard is concerned with the extent of value
273. 89 Wash. 2d 203, 207-11, 571 P.2d 196, 198-200 (1977).
274. The Orion Court stated the followingIn Pacesetter Constr., we rejected a challenge to the balancing approach
based on the distinction between the police power and the eminent domain
power. See Department of Ecology v. Pacesetter Constr.Co., 89 Wash. 2d 203,
210, 571 P.2d 196 (1977). There, the challenger argued that an exercise of the
police power could never trigger the just compensation requirement. We
concluded, however, that a mere verbal distinction did not reconcile property
rights and social needs. Pacesetter Constr., at 210. By recognizing the
distinction between a police power limitation, the validity of which continues
to depend on the balancing test, and a de facto eminent domain taking, we can
better reconcile those competing interests.
Orion II, 109 Wash. 2d at 652 n.20, 747 P.2d at 1078 n.20.
275. Id. at 655, 747 P.2d at 1080.
276. See id. at 655-66, 747 P.2d at 1081.
277. See supra note 258 and accompanying text.
278. See Orion II, 109 Wash. 2d at 665-66, 747 P.2d at 1085-86.
279. Id. at 665, 747 P.2d at 1085-86.
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lost. Losses that are supported by reasonable investments are
more worthy of compensation than those that are not. However, Orion provides little enlightenment on the meaning of
the terms "reasonable" and "investment" and how much value
supported by reasonable investment-backed expectations may
be reduced without effecting a taking.'
IV.

TOWARD CLEARLY ARTICULATED REGULATORY
TAKING DOCTRINE

The regulatory taking principle with the most predictive
value was implicity recognized but apparently not fully appreciated by the court in Orion." This principle, which should be
the first applied once it is determined that a police power measure is subject to the taking limitation, 2 relates to the "character of the government action"2 8 3 or, more precisely, to the
character of the consequences of the regulatory action. This

threshold principle, consistently implied but never clearly
articulated by the courts,2 s effectively recognizes that there
are two categories of police power regulation that are subject
to quite different taking standards.A These categories divide
regulations, on the basis of their purpose and effect, into those
that effectively deprive a property owner of a fundamental
280.
281.
282.
283.
284.
285.

Id. at 665-66, 747 P.2d at 1085-86.
See supra notes 96-108 and accompanying text.
See supra note 253.
Penn Central Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978).
See supra notes 96-108 and accompanying text.
See Keystone, 480 U.S. at 488-89 n.18:
Of course, the type of taking alleged is also an often critical factor. It is
well settled that a "'taking' may more readily be found when the interference
with property can be characterized as a physical invasion by government, see,
e.g., United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256 (1946), than when interference
arises from some public program adjusting the benefits and burdens of
economic life to promote the common good." Penn Central Transportation
Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978). While the Court has almost
invariably found that the permanent physical occupation of property
constitutes a taking, see Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458
U.S. 419, 435-38 (1982), the Court has repeatedly upheld regulations that
destroy or adversely affect real property interests. See, e.g., Connolly v.
Pension Benefit Guaranty Corp., 475 U.S. 211 (1986); Penn Central
TransportationCo. v. New York City, 438 U.S. at 125; Eastlake v. Forest City
Enterprises,Inc., 426 U.S. 668, 674, n.8 (1976); Goldblattv. Hempstead, 369 U.S.
590, 592-593 (1962); Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926); Gorieb v.
Fox, 274 U.S. 603, 608 (1927); Welch v. Swasey, 214 U.S. 91 (1909). This case, of
course, involves land use regulation, not a physical appropriation of
petitioners' property.
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attribute of property2 86 and those that do not. In the first category are regulations that prevent the owner from possessing,
excluding invaders, or perhaps, transferring property rights to
another. 8 7 In the second category are regulations that do not
have any of these consequences but, instead, restrict the use
and development of the property. 2ss
A.

Deprivationof a FundamentalAttribute of Property
Ownership Cases

Regulations that deprive an owner of a fundamental attribute of ownership generally are held to be takings without
applying the ripeness requirement or distinguishing between
facial and as applied challenges; without balancing public gain
and private loss; and without considering diminution in property value, disappointment of investment-backed expectations,
whether value lost is offset by reciprocal benefits, and whether
reasonable value remains. 8 9 In short, such regulations are
subject to essentially the same doctrine as that applicable to
government exercises of eminent domain and government
physical invasions traditionally characterized as inverse condemnations. Thus, the Supreme Court has held that regulations, regardless of their public and private economic impact,
286. See Orion II, 109 Wash. 2d at 664-65, 747 P.2d at 1085. See supra note 96.
287. See, e.g., Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 107 S. Ct. 3141 (1987); Hodel v.
Irving, 481 U.S. 704 (1987); Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986 (1984); Loretto
v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419 (1982); Webb's Fabulous
Pharmacies, Inc. v. Beckwith, 449 U.S. 155 (1980); Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444
U.S. 164 (1979); Granat v. Keasler, 99 Wash. 2d 564, 663 P.2d 830 (1983); Kennedy v.
City of Seattle, 94 Wash. 2d 376, 617 P.2d 713 (1980); Unlimited v. Kitsap County, 50
Wash. App. 723, 750 P.2d 651 (1988); Martin v. City of Seattle, 46 Wash. App. 1, 728
P.2d 1091 (1986).
288. See, e.g., First English Evangelical Lutheran Church v. Los Angeles County,
107 S. Ct. 2378 (1987); Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470
(1987); MacDonald, Sommer & Frates v. Yolo County, 477 U.S. 340 (1986); Williamson
County Regional Planning Comm'n v. Hamilton Bank, 473 U.S. 172 (1985); San Diego
Gas & Elec. Co. v. San Diego, 450 U.S. 621 (1981); Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining &
Reclamation Ass'n, 452 U.S. 264 (1981); Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255 (1980);
Penn Central Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104 (1978); Buttnick v. City of
Seattle, 105 Wash. 2d 857, 719 P.2d 93 (1986); Rains v. Department of Fisheries, 89
Wash. 2d 740, 575 P.2d 1057 (1978); Department of Ecology v. Pacesetter Constr. Co., 89
Wash. 2d 203, 571 P.2d 196 (1977); Maple Leaf Investors, Inc., v. Department of
Ecology, 88 Wash. 2d 726, 565 P.2d 1162 (1977); Lewis v. City of Medina, 87 Wash. 2d 19,
548 P.2d 1093 (1976); Markham Advertising Co. v. State, 73 Wash. 2d 405, 439 P.2d 248
(1968); Carlson v. City of Bellevue, 73 Wash. 2d 41, 435 P.2d 957 (1968); State v. Dexter,
32 Wash. 2d 551, 202 P.2d 906 (1949); Mayer Built Homes, Inc. v. Town of Steilacoom,
17 Wash. App. 558, 564 P.2d 1170 (1977).
289. See, e.g. Hodel, 481 U.S. 704; Loretto, 458 U.S. 419.
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have effected takings by compelling a waterfront landowner to
grant a public easement;' forcing landlords to allow third parties to install cable television devices on their buildings;- 91
allowing public navigation of a formerly nonnavigable private
pond;29 2 requiring the owner of business secrets to publicly disclose them;293 denying owners the interest income earned on

their money, which was deposited in a court account;294 and
barring the inheritance of certain interests in land held by
individual members of an Indian tribe.29 5 Similarly, the Washington courts, without considering the extent of the economic
burden imposed, have characterized the following as takings
regulations: precluding houseboat moorage owners from terminating leases to regain possession;' compelling a landowner
to dedicate a strip of property to widen a public road;' and
barring a landowner from exercising an easement.29
To say that this category of regulation is subject to mainstream eminent domain doctrine may be misleading. While
the results quite clearly support that statement, judicial pronouncements often do not. For example, in the two Washington decisions invalidating city ordinances precluding owners of
leased houseboat moorages from regaining possession, 9 the
Washington Supreme Court employed vague reasonableness
standards. s ° Straightforward recognition that the takings were
based on deprivation of a fundamental property entitlement
would have had more predictive value. In Orion, the court's
recognition that deprivation of a fundamental attribute of ownership is one of two general ways of effecting a regulatory taking by causing excessive economic impact"' misstates the
nature of this principle. Regulatory takings by deprivation of
290. Nollan, 107 S. Ct. at 3145.
291. Loretto, 458 U.S. at 421.

292. Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164 (1979).
293. Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986, 1003-04 (1984).
294. Webb's Fabulous Pharmacies, Inc. v. Beckwith, 449 U.S. 155, 164-65 (1980).
295. Hodel v. Irving, 481 U.S. 704, 717-18, (1987).
296. Granat v. Kessler, 99 Wash. 2d 564, 570, 663 P.2d 830, 833 (1983); Kennedy v.
City of Seattle, 94 Wash. 2d 376, 385, 617 P.2d 713, 719 (1980).
297. Unlimited v. Kitsap County, 50 Wash. App. 723, 727, 750 P.2d 651, 654 (1988).

298. Martin v. City of Seattle, 46 Wash. App. 1, 5, 728 P.2d 1091, 1094 (1986),
reversed on other grounds, 111 Wash. 2d 727, - P.2d - (1988).
299. Granat,99 Wash. 2d 564, 663 P.2d 830; Kennedy, 94 Wash. 2d 376, 617 P.2d 713.
300. In Orion II, the court stated that the ordinance invalidations in Granat and

Kennedy were based on substantive due process. Orion II, 109 Wash. 2d. at 648 n.18,
747 P.2d at 1077 n.18.
301. Id. at 664-65, 747 P.2d at 1085.
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fundamental property entitlements are not based on economic
impact any more than takings by government trespasses are.
If government exercises its power of eminent domain to
acquire a very small part of a holding, government must pay.'0 2
Similarly, if government exercises its police power to preclude
a landowner from exclusively possessing a very small part of a
holding, government must pay retrospectively and repeal the
regulation or pay prospectively. 3 In both cases triviality of
economic impact is irrelevant. So the qualitative standard of
fundamental property right deprivation should be applied at
the beginning of the taking inquiry. A regulation that denies a
fundamental attribute of ownership is a taking, subject to narrow qualifications, 3 ° 4 regardless of the extent of economic loss.
Since the practical and legal effects of such regulation so
closely resemble traditional eminent domain takings, it is
unfortunate that Orion characterized the basis for invalidation
of the houseboat moorage regulations in Kennedy 3o3 and Granat 3° 6 as substantive due process rather than the taking
limitation.
The principle that deprivation of fundamental attributes of
property ownership are takings is not limited to regulations
that secure the benefit of the appropriated property right for
government itself, but applies with equal force to regulations
that effectively reallocate property rights to other people, as in
the houseboat moorage regulation cases.30 7 The principle is not
absolute, but its qualifications generally are coherent and have
substantial predictive value.3°0 The most significant qualification pertains to regulatory exactions that effectively appropriate fundamental property rights by forcing the landowner to
grant public access or dedicate land to public facilities. 0 9 If the
property right exaction is reasonably and quite specifically calculated to prevent or compensate for adverse impacts of the
302. Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419 (1982); 2 J.
SAcKMAN, NICHOLS' THE LAW OF EMINENT DOMAIN § 6.01 (3d ed. 1985).

303. This would seem to be the clear message of Loretto and First English,
combined.
304. See infra notes 308-11 and accompanying text.
305. Kennedy v. City of Seattle, 94 Wash. Zd 376, 617 P.2d 713 (1980).
306. Granat v. Keasler, 99 Wash. 2d 564, 663 P.2d 830 (1983).
307. Id.; Kennedy, 94 Wash. 2d 376, 617 P.2d 713.
308. Neither the rule nor its qualifications have been clearly or fully articulated
by the courts. However, to the extent that the doctrine is unarticulated and intuitive,
coherent principles explaining outcomes are inferable.
309. See supra note 243.
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proposed development on public interests
worthy of govern310
ment protection, there is no taking.
Another qualification recognizes that what might seem to
be a regulatory appropriation of a fundamental attribute of
ownership may be more properly characterized as a limitation
of property ownership itself under the state's acknowledged
power to define property. sx Obviously this qualification,
unless effectively limited, could swallow the rule. While the
limits that the taking clause imposes on state power to define
3 12
property rights are not defined with precision, they do exist.

Radical redefinitions of property have not and will not preclude takings. This is especially so where the revisions seem
opportunistic or subversive.s 3
A regulatory taking analysis that makes a threshold distinction between regulations effectively appropriating fundamental property rights and regulations restricting use would
be desirable for several reasons. The realm of the vague principles applicable to regulatory restrictions of use would be
effectively reduced. The potentially coherent doctrine applicable to regulatory appropriations of property rights could be
more fully developed. The separate analysis of these two categories of regulation might even induce the Supreme Court to
restrict the applicability of the taking limitation to the regulatory appropriation of property rights category, which would be
similar to the Washington Supreme Court's ideal rule. 1 4
As suggested earlier in this Article, 1 5 there are strong
arguments, based upon policy and legal symmetry, that there
should be no second category of regulatory takings, that regulations that restrict only use and development without effectively appropriating a fundamental property right should not
even be subject to the taking limitation and its compensation
remedy. Conceivably, the United States Supreme Court could
produce this outcome gracefully by explaining that FirstEnglish decided only whether the remedy of inverse condemnation
310. See Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 107 S. Ct. 3141 (1987); Unlimited v.
Kitsap County, 50 Wash. App. 723, 750 P.2d 651 (1988).
311. PruneYard Shopping Center v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 84 (1980).
312. See Hodel v. Irving, 481 U.S. 704 (1987); Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan
CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 426 (1982); Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 17475 (1979); Kmiec, supra note 47, at 1641-44.
313. See supra note 312; Michelman, supra note 1, at 1611.
314. Orion II, 109 Wash. 2d at 649-52, 747 P.2d at 1077-78.
315. See supra notes 215-17 and accompanying text.
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damages was available for a regulatory taking and not whether
the case involved a regulation even subject to the taking limitation.31 6 The Court might go on to explain that Pennsylvania
Coal was subject to the taking limitation because the challenged regulation effectively appropriated the support estate in
land, a fundamental attribute of property ownership in Pennsylvania. 31 7 Loose ends might be wrapped up by systematically
318
accounting for the fundamental property right deprivation
and use restriction 319 cases decided in the last decade. The
Court might explain that, in the latter cases, it never had
found a taking, had expressed serious doubts about the applicability of the taking limitation, and, indeed, had been using the
word "taking" as a metaphor for deprivation of substantive due
process,"0 after all.
The Supreme Court has never held a regulation that
merely restricts use, no matter how severely, to be a taking.3 21
In these decisions, the Court has variously mentioned some or
all of the following as appropriate considerations: the balance
of public gain and private loss; diminution in property value;
disappointment of investment-backed expectations; reciprocal
regulatory benefits; and what, if any, post-regulatory value
316. In FirstEnglish, the Court made quite clear the narrow limits of its holding:
We accordingly have no occasion to decide whether the ordinance at issue
actually denied appellant all use of its property or whether the county might
avoid the conclusion that a compensable taking had occurred by establishing
that the denial of all use was insulated as a part of the State's authority to
enact safety regulations. See e.g., Goldblatt v. Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590 (1962);
Hadacheck v. Sebastian, 239 U.S. 394 (1915); Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623
(1887). These questions, of course, remain open for decision on the remand we
direct today. We now turn to the question of whether the Just Compensation
Clause requires the government to pay for "temporary" regulatory takings.
First English Evangelical Lutheran Church v. Los Angeles County, 107 S. Ct. 2378,
2384-85 (1987) (footnotes omitted).
317. See Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470, 500 (1987).
318. See, e.g., Hodel v. Irving, 481 U.S. 704 (1987); Nollan v. California Coastal
Comm'n, 107 S. Ct. 3141 (1987); Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986 (1984);
Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419 (1982); Webb's Fabulous
Pharmacies, Inc. v. Beckwith, 449 U.S. 155 (1980); Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444
U.S. 164 (1979).
319. See, e.g., First English, 107 S. Ct. 2378 (1987); Keystone, 480 U.S. 470;
MacDonald, Sommer & Frates v. Yolo County, 477 U.S. 340 (1986); Hodel v. Virginia
Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass'n, 452 U.S. 264 (1981); Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447
U.S. 255 (1980).
320. See Williamson County Regional Planning Comm'n v. Hamilton Bank, 473
U.S. 172, 186, 197-98 (1985).
321. See, e.g., First English, 107 S. Ct. 2378, Keystone, 480 U.S. 470; Yolo County,
477 U.S. 340; Hamilton Bank, 473 U.S. 172; Virginia Surface Mining, 452 U.S. 264;
Agins, 447 U.S. 255.
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remains.3 22 But lacking elaboration and systematic application,
these considerations or factors have virtually no predictive
value. Unless or until the Supreme Court holds that the taking clause is no longer applicable to use regulation cases, much
can be done to reduce confusion about the governing principles. Even if the Court believes that more precise standards
are not desirable, the relationships among the stated principles
and standards might be explained in ways that the case results
3 23
support.
B. Ripeness
A first step toward doctrinal coherence in the field of use
regulation would be to clarify the ripeness requirement and its
relationship to facial and as applied challenges. 2 4 Some of the
cases have held that a taking challenge will not be entertained
until all possibilities of obtaining permission for reasonable
property use have been exhausted. 25 In other cases, taking
challenges were deemed justiciable without evidence of exactly
how the claimant was burdened.3 26 Until the very recent decision of Pennell v. City of San Jose,3 z it seemed clear that the
ripeness requirement pertained only to as applied and not to
facial challenges,3 28 even though the Court had not clearly said
so. 2 9 In Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation
Ass'n 33 0 and Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis,3 3 l the Court reviewed two regulations based on facial challenges and held that the mere enactment of regulatory statutes
violated the taking limitation even though there had been no
determination of actual and specific regulatory burdens. The
Court emphasized that the challengers faced an "uphill battle, ' 332 but allowed the battle to be fought, albeit unsuccessfully. Then, inexplicably, in Pennell, the Court rejected, as
322. See supra note 321.
323. See infra text following note 346.
324. See supra notes 109-114 and accompanying text.
325. See, e.g., Yolo County, 477 U.S. 340; Hamilton Bank, 473 U.S. 172; Estate of
Friedman v. Pierce County, 112 Wash. 2d 68, - P.2d - (1989).
326. See, e.g., Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255 (1980); Penn Central Transp.
Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104 (1978); Orion II, 109 Wash. 2d 621, 747 P.2d 1062.
327. 108 S. Ct. 849 (1988).
328. See Pennell v. City of San Jose, 108 S. Ct. 849, 860 (1988) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting); Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470, 495 (1987).
329. See supra note 328.
330. 452 U.S. 264 (1981).
331. 480 U.S. 470 (1987).
332. Id. at 495-96; Virginia Surface Mining, 452 U.S. at 295-97.
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premature, a facial regulatory taking challenge of a rent control ordinance that required that the economic hardship of a
landlord's tenants be considered by a regulatory official in
determining permissible rents.333 The facial challenge was
held to be nonjusticiable without a concrete determination of
the regulatory burdens imposed.3 While Pennell might have
been supportable by reasons that would have distinguished the
facial challenges entertained in Keystone and Virginia Surface
Mining, no such reasons were given. Indeed, to the consternation of dissenting Justice Scalia, Justice Rehnquist, writing for
the majority, relied primarily on a blatantly erroneous interpretation of Virginia Surface Mining.3 The majority did not
even mention Keystone, which less than a year earlier had
decided such a facial challenge and had relied on Virginia Surface Mining for doing so. 3 1 Confusion about the meaning of

the ripeness requirement in the as applied cases was generated
by Hamilton Bank's characterization of Penn Central and
Agins as decisions that refused to consider taking challenges
for lack of ripeness.3 3 7 Both Penn Central and Agins did
Both considered ripeness,
decide as applied taking issues.'
not as a prerequisite to the justiciability of regulatory takings,
but as a determinant of the facts or factual assumptions to
which taking doctrine would be applied. Since the Agins had
not sought regulatory permission to build, and since Penn Central had not sought permission to build anything less grand
than its proposed skyscraper, the Court made essentially best
case assumptions as to what use the challenged regulations
would allow. The unresolved inconsistency between Hamilton
Bank, on the one hand, and Agins and Penn Central, on the
other, has left the precise meaning of the ripeness requirement
in doubt.33 9
333.
334.
335.
336.
337.
338.

Pennell, 108 S. Ct. at 856-57.
Id
Id. at 860-61
Id. at 849.
Hamilton Bank, 473 U.S. at 187.
The Court never has defined the terms "facial" and "as applied" in the

context of regulatory taking challenges. While Penn Central and Agins generally are
characterized as facial challenges, they were not. Keystone characterizes facial
challenges as tests of the constitutionality of an enactment without reference to any
specific application. See Keystone, 480 U.S. at 493-94. Yet both Penn Central and Agins
considered and relied to some extent on specific applications of the challenged
regulation to the challengers' property. See Agins, 447 U.S. at 262; Penn Central, 438
U.S. at 131.
339. Keystone and Virginia Surface Mining have addressed the standards applied
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C. Regulation of Nuisance-Like Uses
A second constructive step toward reducing the range of
uncertainty in the use regulation cases would be the explicit
recognition and clear articulation of special principles governing the constitutionality of police power measures barring
nuisance or nuisance-like uses. Once a frustrated use has been
judicially characterized in terms of nuisance, little if any heed
is given to: The extent of value diminution and its relation to
public gain; whether the value lost was backed by reasonable
investment; the existence or nonexistence of offsetting reciprocal benefits; and whether any reasonable use or value
remains. s4 0 The case results support, and the Court has come
close to explicitly recognizing, a rule that such regulations are
not takings regardless of the variables pertinent to other use
restrictions. 4 As the recent Keystone case illustrates, this de
facto rule is justified on the basis of several distinct principles:'
Since one has no property right to maintain a nuisance,
no property has been taken; s 3 since such regulation merely
involves governmental arbitration of private conflict, rather
than enhancement of a public enterprise, the taking limitation
is inapplicable;'" and, carrying the balancing test to its logical
conclusion, since the public gain in protecting society from
serious threats is virtually infinite, so too may be the private
loss. 4 5 Explicit recognition of this rule and articulation of its
underlying principle would serve the cause of greater doctrinal
coherence in the use regulation cases. s46
to facial and to as applied challenges without either acknowledging or resolving the
uncertainty about what the ripeness requirement really means in both contexts. See
Keystone, 480 U.S. at 494-95; Virginia Surface Mining, 452 U.S. at 295-97.
340. See, e.g., Miller v. Schoene, 276 U.S. 272, 279-80 (1928); Village of Euclid v.
Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 389-96 (1926); Hadacheck v. Sebastian, 239 U.S. 394,
410-12 (1915); Reinman v. City of Little Rock, 237 U.S. 171, 177-79 (1915).
341. See supra note 340.
342. Keystone, 480 U.S. at 491 n.20, 492 n.22.
343. See id.; Hadacheck, 239 U.S. at 410-11.
344. See, e.g., Penn Central Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 125-28
(1978); Miller, 276 U.S. at 279-80.
345. Penn Central,438 U.S. at 140. Explicit recognition that regulatory abatement
or preclusion of "nuisance" land uses cannot be a taking would still leave difficult
definitional questions for resolution. Given the amorphous state of common law,
nuisance doctrine and its tendency to delegate wide discretion to trial court judges,
little predictability would be gained without definitional refinement.
346. There is general agreement on the existence of the nuisance exception, but
there is sharp controversy about its nature and extent. Compare the majority and
dissenting opinions in Keystone, 480 U.S. at 491-93, 511-15 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
See R. EPSTEIN, PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE POWER OF EMINENT DOMAIN 112-125
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Beyond Ad Hocery

A third, very long step toward the development of regulatory taking principles to govern use regulations would abandon
the rhetoric that cases are decided on their facts and get on
with the difficult work of explaining, perhaps modifying, and
elaborating upon ambiguous, disjointed doctrine. Cases cannot
be decided on their facts alone. There must be some normative
basis, intuitive or cognitive, for evaluating facts and determining consequences. The challenge is to bring these determinants into the realm of consciousness, that is, to ascertain and
articulate the intuitive legal norms that fill the gaps in regulatory taking doctrine.
For example, what does diminution in value really mean
and how is it determined?" 4 How are offsetting reciprocal regulatory benefits measured and applied? 48 When is an increment of value backed by reasonable investment and to what
extent are the resulting economic expectations protected from
disappointment by the taking limitation?" 9 May diminutions
of value, which otherwise would be takings, be balanced, that
is, legally neutralized, by public gain?' 5 If so, how are public
gains measured? Are some public interests deemed weightier
than others? Is public harm prevention more justifiable than
public benefit conferral and, if so, how are these variables
defined?"' Is the taking issue, in this area of property use
restrictions, really concerned with the extent of value diminution or the extent of reasonable value remaining,"2 or both? If
both, what is the relative role of each? 353 Coherent doctrine
may be inferable from state and federal regulatory taking decisions, but it will not be ascertained and articulated as long as
the rhetoric of "deciding each case on its facts" prevails.'
(1985); Kmiec, supra note 47, at 1638-1640; Radin, The Liberal Conception of Property:
Cross Currents in the Jurisprudenceof Takings, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 1668-1670 (1988);
Rose-Ackerman, supra note 2, at 1711 n.66.
347. See supra notes 277-79 and accompanying text.
348. See Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 124-29; Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260
U.S. 393, 413 (1922); Department of Ecology v. Pacesetter Constr. Co., 89 Wash. 2d 203,
210-11, 571 P.2d 196, 200 (1977).
349. See supra notes 264-67 and accompanying text.
350. See supra notes 268-76 and accompanying text.
351. See supra notes 201-05 and accompanying text.
352. See supra notes 253-55 and accompanying text.
353. Are they independent or interdependent?
354. See supra notes 1-8 and accompanying text.
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THE ALLINGHAM ENIGMA

Less than two months after the Orion magnum opus on
regulatory takings, the Washington Supreme Court issued its
baffling opinion in Allingham v. City of Seattle.355 Allingham
is as simplistic as Orion is complex. While the result in
Allingham might have been supported by reasoning consistent
with the analytical framework painstakingly set forth in
Orion, it was not. The Allingham reasoning ignores, contradicts, and bears no resemblance to the Orion regulatory taking
doctrine. Indeed, Orion was not even cited,' which was ironic
since the court, in that case, chastised the United States
Supreme Court for failing to adequately interrelate its three
recent regulatory taking decisions. 357 It was widely assumed
that a breakdown of communication within the court must
have been to blame and the glaring inconsistencies would be
resolved after reconsideration.'
But the expected reconciliation never occurred, as the court denied the motion for reconsideration and entered an "Order Changing Opinion" adding a
single cryptic footnote to the opinion. 9 Perhaps, by endorsing
Orion, the footnote implied that all inconsistencies should be
resolved in favor of the prior decision. 3 °
In Allingham, a group of landowners sought invalidation
of Seattle's Greenbelt Ordinance arguing, inter alia, that it
effected an unconstitutional taking of property without compensation. The ordinance superimposed an overlay zone on
existing zoning designations. The additional restrictions, which
varied with underlying zone designation and lot size, required
affected landowners to maintain thirty to fifty percent of their
land in its natural "greenbelt" state and to restore from disturbed to greenbelt status an additional ten to twenty percent
of their land. Narrowly limited dispensing provisions of the
ordinance authorized reduction of greenbelt and restored
greenbelt requirements by ten percent of the total lot. 6 '
355. 109 Wash. 2d 947, 749 P.2d 160, modified, 757 P.2d 533 (1988).
356. Orion H was not cited in the decision as originally issued and published.
Nearly eight months after the decision the court added footnote one to its decision,
citing Orion 1I by an Order Changing Opinion. Allingham, 109 Wash. 2d at 953 n.1, 749
P.2d 160, modiied, 757 P.2d at 533 n.1. For the text of footnote 1, see iqfza text
accompanying note 385.
357. Orion II, 109 Wash. 2d at 653 n.21, 747 P.2d at 1079 n.21.
358. See supra note 16.
359. See supra note 18 and infra note 385 and accompanying text.
360. See infra notes 385-98 and accompanying text.
361. Allingham, 109 Wash. 2d at 949, 749 P.2d at 162.
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The court unanimously held that the ordinance, by precluding profitable use of fifty to seventy percent of the land,
effected a taking without compensation in violation of the state
and federal constitutions." 2 The court's sparse reasoning,
occupying less than one and a half pages of the short opinion," is logically sound, but its legal foundation is faulty. The
court started with the premise that facially challenged police
power regulation constitutes a taking of private property if it
"(1) does not substantially promote legitimate public interests,
3 4
or (2) deprives the owner of any profitable use of the land."
The ordinance clearly passed the first test. The greenbelt regulations served several legitimate public interests. s 6 But the
ordinance failed the second standard, as that standard was
amended by the court. The fatal flaw in the court's reasoning
was this modification of the second test, which was unsupported by precedent and, indeed, directly contrary to a line of
United States Supreme Court decisions culminating in the
recent Keystone case. 3 6 The court held that the test of deprivation "of any profitable use of the land" meant deprivation of
any profitable use of "a substantialportion of' the land." The
court went on to reason that the ordinance deprived owners of
any profitable use of fifty to seventy percent of their land and,
therefore, was a taking."
In holding a land use regulation precluding profitable use
of any portion of the land to be a taking regardless of how
profitably the remainder of a site may be used, the court relied
on well-established physical taking (eminent domain) doctrine.
If the City were to take a portion of certain properties for
the purpose of building a road, clearly we would hold that
the City must pay for the land so taken. Likewise where, as
here, the City takes a portion of certain properties for the
purpose of preserving greenbelts, the City must pay for the
362. Id. at 952-53, 749 P.2d at 163.
363. Id. at 952-53, 749 P.2d at 163-64.
364. Id. at 952, 749 P.2d at 163.
365. The greenbelts were intended to provide buffers between incompatible land
uses, to mitigate the effects of noise and air pollution, to limit development of
environmentally sensitive areas unsuitable for building, to maintain habitat for
wildlife, and to relieve the monotony of continuous urban development.
366. See, e.g., Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470
(1987); Penn Central Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104 (1978).
367. Allingham, 109 Wash. 2d at 952, 749 P.2d at 163 (emphasis added).

368. Id.
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9
land taken. 3

The court's mistake was its equation of regulatory taking
and eminent domain doctrine in a use regulation case. ° A
physical acquisition by government deprives a landowner not
merely of profitable use but of the fundamental attributes of
property ownership-to possess, to exclude, to alienate. Police
power regulation that merely restricts use does not effectively
appropriate fundamental attributes of property ownership.3
Here, the greenbelt ordinance did not affect the rights of owners to possess, to use in compatible ways, and to exclude others
from entering the portions of lots upon which development
was restricted. This fundamental difference in effect of government acquisition and land-use regulation is the most likely
basis for the longstanding principle of regulatory taking doctrine that challenged police power regulation of land use is
evaluated on the basis of its detrimental effect on a landowner's use of the parcel as a whole.37 2 Thus, the earliest
United States Supreme Court regulatory taking decisions
upheld building height and setback restrictions against claims
that landowners were unconstitutionally deprived of a portion
of their property.
The principle that a taking should be
determined by evaluating the parcel as a whole recently was
reaffirmed in Penn Central374 and very recently was definitively explained in Keystone.3 75 Washington regulatory taking
decisions, including Orion, have consistently honored this
principle.

37 6

369. Id. at 953, 749 P.2d at 163-64.
370. The distinction between the two has been recognized since Pennsylvania Coal
v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 (1922): "Government hardly could go on if, to some extent,
values incident to property could not be diminished without paying for every change in
the general law. As long recognized, some values are enjoyed under an implied
limitation and must yield to the police power." I. at 413.
371. Orion II, 109 Wash. 2d at 664-65, 747 P.2d at 1085 ("Where an owner possesses
a full bundle of property rights, the regulatory scheme's economic impact is
determined by viewing the bundle in its entirety.") (relying on Keystone, 480 U.S. at
498-99).
372. See supra note 371; see also Department of Natural Resources v. Thurston
County, 92 Wash. 2d 656, 669-69, 601 P.2d 494, 500-01 (1979).
373. Gorieb v. Fox, 274 U.S. 603, 608 (1927); Welch v. Swasey, 214 U.S. 91, 105-08
(1909).
374. Penn Central Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 130 (1978)
(" 'Taking' jurisprudence does not divide a single parcel into discrete segments and
attempt to determine whether rights in a particular segment have been entirely
abrogated.")
375. Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470, 488-502 (1987).
376. Orion II, 109 Wash. 2d at 664, 747 P.2d at 1085.
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Because the Allingham opinion indicates no awareness of
the directly contrary federal constitutional doctrine, it is
impossible to tell whether the court consciously rejected that
doctrine. Since evaluating a taking based on a substantial portion of the property is less restrictive than evaluating the parcel as a whole, the court could have gone beyond federal
constitutional requirements on state constitutional grounds,3" 7
although it did not expressly do so, apparently relying on both
federal and state taking limitations. 78
The Allingham regulatory taking analysis also is deviant
in that it bypasses the threshold analytical step stressed in
Orion. If the court had followed its Orion regulatory taking
doctrine, it first would have determined whether the challenged regulation was even subject to the taking limitation and
its compensation remedy. Orion had explicitly held that police
power measures that substantially serve the public interest in
safeguarding health, safety, environment, or the fiscal integrity
of the community were not subject to the taking limitation and
the remedy of compensation; rather, such measures were subject to the substantive due process limitation and the remedy
of invalidation. 7 9 Moreover, in dicta, the court in Orion
seemed to say that the taking limitation applied only when the
challenger sought the remedy of compensation. 8 ° Under both
of these propositions, which arguably deviate from minimum
federal constitutional standards, and hence, may be invalid,"1
the Allingham Greenbelt Ordinance challenge would have
been subject only to substantive due process and not the taking
limitation. The Greenbelt Ordinance was explicitly found to
substantially advance favored public interests;-82 and it was
absolutely clear that the challengers sought only the remedy of
invalidation.3 8 3
Apparently, the court was attempting to correct this
departure from Orion doctrine by qualifying the Allingham
377. See id. at 652, 747 P.2d at 1079.
378. Allingham, 109 Wash. 2d at 950, 749 P.2d at 162 ("The trial court found that
the effect of . . . the ordinance was to take the property of the greenbelt owners
without compensation and that therefore ... the ordinance [was an] invalid use of the
police power under the Washington State Constitution.").

379. Orion II, 109 Wash. 2d at 654-55, 747 P.2d at 1080.
380. Id. at 649, 747 P.2d at 1077 ("The crucial difference lies in the remedy to be
applied: invalidation or the payment of just compensation.").

381. See supra notes 215 to 233 and accompanying text.
382. Allingham, 109 Wash. 2d at 952, 749 P.2d at 163.
383. Id. at 948, 749 P.2d at 161.
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conclusion that "the Greenbelt Ordinance is invalid" with the
recently added footnote one:- s4
The remedy we grant of invalidation of the ordinance is
the remedy consistent with the denial of substantive due
process. Orion Corp. v. State, 109 Wash. 2d 621, 747 P.2d 1062
(1987). Overly severe landowner regulations have previously
resulted in our labeling those actions as "takings." Granatv.
Keasler, 99 Wash. 2d 564, 663 P.2d 830 (1983). 3 w
The footnote to Allingham seemed to be an indirect way
of saying "We did not really mean that the ordinance constituted an unconstitutional taking of private property without
just compensation; rather, we meant that the ordinance, on its
face, constituted an unconstitutional deprivation of property
without due process; so please delete all reference to state and
federal taking clauses and replace them with due process provisions;s86 and remember that the word 'taking' was but a metaphor 8 7 for 'overly severe regulation' in violation of
substantive due process for which the remedy of compensation
is not available",m
Whether the new footnote one was also meant to imply
that some unarticulated substantive due process standard
should be substituted for Allingham's taking standard is
unknown. If so, does footnote one negate the Allingham standard, which, by isolating any substantial portion of the regulated land, is clearly at odds with black letter federal law?" 9
Or does it mean that the Allingham taking standard is really
the substantive due process standard for unduly oppressive
regulation?
In Orion, the court acknowledged that the third prong of
substantive due process, which precludes unduly oppressive
police power regulation, is vague, apparently governed by a
largely unexplained unreasonableness criterion.'
Unfortu384. See supra note 18.
385. Allingham, 109 Wash. 2d at 953 n.l., 749 P.2d 160, modifted, 757 P.2d at 533
n.1.
386. See Orion II, 109 Wash. 2d at 654-64, 747 P.2d at 1079-85.
387. See supra note 321.
388. Orion II, 109 Wash. 2d at 648, 747 P.2d at 1076-77; see supra notes 151-65 and
accompanying text.
389. See supra note 366-78 and accompanying text.
390. Orion II, 109 Wash. 2d at 655 n.24, 747 P.2d at 1080 n.24. ("We also assume
that whether the regulation is overly oppressive on the individual property owner
depends on such factors as the nature of the harm sought to be avoided, the
availability and effectiveness of less drastic protective measures, and the economic loss
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nately, with its footnote modification of Allingham, the court
rejected an opportunity to explain the due process standard of
overly severe regulation, which presumably was applied. What
made the greenbelt ordinance unreasonable? The landowners
were not deprived of a "fundamental attribute of property
ownership" as they were in Granat v. Keasler,3 9 ' the only case
besides Orion cited in footnote one. As in Orion, 92 the owners
were free to possess, use, exclude others from, and transfer
ownership in the restricted area. Was the ordinance unreasonable because it denied all profitable use of a substantial portion
(i.e., about fifty percent) of their land? If so, how did the court
distinguish this restriction from flood control regulation in
Maple Leaf Investors, Inc. v. Department of Ecology,39 3 which
precluded structural development of seventy percent of the
plaintiff's land; and SEPA-infused subdivision regulation in
Departmentof Natural Resources v. Thurston County,39 which
required that a major area of the proposed plat be preserved in
its natural state as eagle habitat? Was the ordinance unreasonable because it imposed an affirmative obligation that certain
cleared areas be replanted? If so, why was the Seattle historic
district regulation requiring a building owner to replace a parapet not unreasonable in Buttnick v. City of Seattle?3 95 Was the
ordinance unreasonable because it failed to meet the substantive due process requirement (with some equal protection overtones) that the various classes established within the
legislation be reasonably related to the legitimate object of the
legislation?' 9 If so, how did the special and severe restrictions
of Buttnick's historic district ordinance survive? 3 1 Was the
greenbelt regulation unreasonable because private loss outbalanced public gain? If so, how were private loss and public gain
calculated and how did this calculus compare with the court's
balancing
in
Maple Leaf Investors
and Pacesetter
398
Construction?
suffered by the property owner. Goldblatt v. Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590, 594-95, 8 L. Ed.
2d 130, 82 S. Ct. 987, 990 (1962)." (emphasis added)).
391. 99 Wash. 2d 564, 570, 663 P.2d 830, 833 (1983).
392. See Orion II, 109 Wash. 2d at 664, 747 P.2d at 1085.
393. 88 Wash. 2d 726, 734, 565 P.2d 1162, 1166 (1977).
394. 92 Wash. 2d 656, 669-70, 601 P.2d 494, 500-501 (1979).
395. 105 Wash. 2d 857, 862, 719 P.2d 93, 96 (1986).
396. See, e.g., Kennedy v. City of Seattle, 94 Wash. 2d 376, 382, 617 P.2d 713, 717

(1980).
397. See Buttnick v. City of Seattle, 105 Wash. 2d 857, 858, 719 P.2d 93, 94 (1986).
398. Maple Leaf Investors, Inc., v. Department of Ecology, 88 Wash. 2d 726, 731-33,
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If, under the Orion doctrine, most police power regulations will be constitutionally evaluated by the standards of substantive due process rather than regulatory takings," the
tedious judicial task of explaining the meaning of unreasonableness 4" becomes especially important. Systematic explanation of the meaning of this due process standard each time it is
applied and the relationship between each new application and
prior case law is essential if Orion's promise of coherent constitutional doctrine on the permissible extent of land use regulatory burdens is to be fulfilled.
VI.

CONCLUSION

This Article has focused on what is and, by logical inference and extrapolation, what might be the law of regulatory
takings. It largely has ignored what ought to be the law and
what substantive values ought to be reflected and promoted.
This orientation was predicated upon the conviction that courts
do not construct doctrinal edifices on shifting sands. Scholarly
prescriptions of every ideological and jurisprudential stripe
abound. But these prescriptions will not significantly influence
the course of the law absent judicial resolve to develop coherent regulatory taking doctrine. The virtually universal inclination of American courts has been to avoid the difficult,
fundamental questions. What are the relative roles of the taking and substantive due process clauses as limitations on the
permissible extent of regulatory burdens? What purposes
were these two constitutional limitations designed to serve?
Are they concerned with wealth redistribution, allocative efficiency, or some absolute ecological or self-actualization
through property ethic? Do the purposes of the substantive
due process and taking limitation differ? If designed to serve
multiple purposes, what is their order of relative priority?
Without a solid foundation of guiding principles, largely
intuitive judicial responses and vague, somewhat aimless doctrine seem inevitable. In Orion, the court began to address
these fundamental questions. In Allingham, the court
returned to intuition. Whether Orion's rare promise of doctrinal development will be fulfilled remains to be seen.
565 P.2d 1162, 1164-65 (1977); Department of Ecology v. Pacesetter Constr. Co., 89
Wash. 2d 203, 208-13, 571 P.2d 196, 198-20 (1977).
399. See Orion II, 109 Wash. 2d at 644-54, 747 P.2d at 1074-79.

400. See supra note 390.
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intuitive judicial responses and vague, somewhat aimless doctrine seem inevitable. In Orion, the court began to address
these fundamental questions. In Aliingham, the court
returned to intuition. Whether Orion's rare promise of doctrinal development will be fulfilled remains to be seen.

